| 1956 Franco-British Alliance (Not Union) | |
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| Topic Started: Nov 2 2015, 05:17 AM (361 Views) | |
| Delta Force | Nov 2 2015, 05:17 AM Post #1 |
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This is related to my Cold War timeline, which I am considering reviving. What if France and the United Kingdom had decided to begin an alliance of sorts in 1956, as a weaker and less ridiculous version of the 1956 Franco-British Union proposal? They could collaborate on nuclear energy and weapons, with the British being their knowledge and infrastructure, with the French bringing raw materials and financing (British Magnox and French UNGG reactors are quite similar). The costs of developing various other technologies and projects could also be split between the two countries, and working together they would be able to establish a larger market for commercial aerospace projects and other initiatives to better compete with the Soviet Union and United States. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Nov 3 2015, 12:34 AM Post #2 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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Not worth it. The Frogs bring nothing to the table in that timeframe for nuclear weapons or energy, being the better part of a decade away. Britain wanted security ties with the United States, not with France. Even then, French participation in NATO was lagging. France didn't have the raw materials and didn't have the finance. Aerospace is an idea, but Britain at that stage was far ahead of France and only ended up cooperating after continually shooting themselves in the foot and groin between 1956 and 1965. There are strong reasons it didn't happen that wouldn't be butterflied away. The impact of Suez was not just against the Americans. |
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| Delta Force | Nov 3 2015, 01:23 AM Post #3 |
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France and the rest of Europe offer the British a large market. The French and British markets by themselves are too small to offer highly advanced products at competitive prices that can also pay off development costs. There's also the idea of having to be present to win. The British leave France free to exert massive influence on the future course of Europe by not participating in scientific and other organizations. Suez also should have made it clear that the British didn't have a special relationship with the United States. In 1946 the McMahon Act banned the British from nuclear technology they had played a key role in making happen. Then, in 1956 the United States refused to supply France and the United Kingdom with petroleum to replace embargoed sources, and even threaten to actively harm their economies. Edited by Delta Force, Nov 3 2015, 04:39 AM.
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| Simon Darkshade | Nov 3 2015, 01:39 AM Post #4 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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France isn't a large market in and of itself. It doesn't bring Europe along with it, given that Italy and West Germany were American markets, Spain wasn't in play and the Low Countries were already large British aerospace and defence markets. Britain's problem wasn't its market size per se, but that it had too many marques and companies for its size, which diluted funding, design capability and several other factors. By 1956, the British were within sight of the H-Bomb and already had the foundations of a strategic relationship with the United States. Suez was many things and the Americans did play hardball, but not enough to completely alter Britain's trajectory, its Atlanticist orientation and it national interests. McMahon was on its last legs. Pre-Suez, Britain wasn't interested in joining the proto EEC. Afterwards, it was eager due to undershooting its status and power; British policy between 1956 and 1979 involved a lot of cutting off noses to spite faces. |
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| Delta Force | Nov 3 2015, 10:53 PM Post #5 |
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I just looked into the British jet bomber programs of the 1950s, and it looks like there was definitely a major issue with too many projects. The British had as many, if not more, firms working on aircraft and also nuclear reactors as the superpowers. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Nov 4 2015, 07:06 AM Post #6 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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It gets better - many of those competing firms were actually owned by the same companies. |
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| Delta Force | Nov 6 2015, 04:18 AM Post #7 |
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How did that work out? Also, the United Kingdom isn't really a country you associate with artisanal aircraft, ships, and high technology and heavy industrial products, but looking into things I wouldn't be surprised if Italy had more industry consolidation. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Nov 7 2015, 11:48 AM Post #8 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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It worked out quite poorly. Britain did have a lot what one could term artisanal industry and generally had a lot of smaller firms rather than the right balance. It later went down the route of consolidation into single often nationalized monopolies, which had a lot of their own problems. |
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| Delta Force | Nov 12 2015, 08:23 AM Post #9 |
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What about Blue Streak? Officially it was canceled due to vulnerability, but it seems to have been more of a political decision. All missiles of the era had to wait a few minutes for their guidance systems to align, so the fact that the missile was taking on liquids during that period didn't really matter much. A 3.5 minute response time probably is faster than what aircraft on ground alert status could have achieved. If the British had to create an independent deterrent or work with the French, would they have gone for Blue Streak, Blue Steel MK. II (akin to Skybolt), or something else? |
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| Simon Darkshade | Nov 12 2015, 09:14 AM Post #10 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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Blue Streak was a good missile for its time and the issues were certainly political. There was the interservice rivalry between the RAF and RN, civil service and Treasury opposition to spending large amounts of money. Some of the later air launched weapon proposals were considerably in advance of Blue Steel II; the details are in the relevant British Secret Projects book I'd have to dig out. The Vulcan B.3 with 6 Skybolts had some other interesting capabilities and options. With the British and French cooperating, a rather interesting triad could be built up with 4-5 SSBNs each, the Force de Frappe and RAF operating Vulcans and MRBM/IRBM squadrons. Neither Britain nor France really has the space for a lot of ground based fixed silo missiles. The size and 'shape' of an Anglo-French force would depend on what the Americans were doing and to what extent they leave their policies of minimal deterrence behind. |
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| Delta Force | Nov 16 2015, 06:31 AM Post #11 |
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Any ideas on possible collaborations beyond nuclear energy and weapons? Right now I'm thinking something with the CVA-01 and Verdun could be interesting, as well as the Type 82 destroyer and Suffren class. I suppose there's also the EM-2 rifle and its .280 British cartridge. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Nov 16 2015, 07:14 AM Post #12 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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EM-2 had come and gone. CVA-01 and associated vessels had the issue of politics against them - no need for carriers and other Cold War ships if Britain was going to pull back from East of Suez. In many ways, Britain's defence policy in the 1957-1972 period really rode the crest of two strong and completely rubbish bits of prevailing wisdom - that aircraft carriers were obsolete and on the way out; and that manned fighters would never be needed again. 3-4 CVA-01 with AFVGs, 100 Vulcan B.3s, a full order of TSR-2s and an RAF/RN Phantom equivalent would be nothing to sneeze at. |
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8:39 AM Jul 11