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Naval Ships and Technologies without the Arms Treaties
Topic Started: May 23 2014, 03:12 AM (507 Views)
Delta Force

The 1920s and 1930s saw a series of arms treaties that significantly shaped the path of naval developments during the post-World War I era. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the 1930 London Naval Treaty were the two with the most impact, in terms of taking place early enough to have a major impact on both post-World War I and pre-World War II building programs (the 1936 London Naval Treaty was only briefly followed).

The Americans, British, and Japanese already had warships with 18 inch guns and 45,000 tons displacement planned or undergoing construction during the Washington Naval Conference. Heavy cruisers were just entering service (the Royal Navy's Hawkins class led to the 8 inch gun, 10,000 tons limit), and nations had differing plans for them as well, with the British preferring large numbers of small cruisers and other nations preferring smaller numbers of larger cruisers. The British wanted the treaty as a way to impose a maximum cruiser tonnage and keep costs down. The naval treaties also facilitated and ended two new types of warships in the 1920s. Nations were allowed to convert ships in service or building into aircraft carriers to meet the fleet tonnage restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty, and several battlecruisers were completed as large aircraft carriers. However, restrictions on cruisers and submarines led to the end of the cruiser submarine concept, which had been armed with 8 inch and even 12 inch guns.

Assuming that the sizes of ships, armaments, and navies were allowed to develop naturally, what kind of changes would we see in ship design and the growth of navies in the 1920s and 1930s?
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Simon Darkshade
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
20s designs would level off at 54-55,000t to minimize the need for major drydock infrastructure investment at the same time as shipbuilding. Battlecruisers and fast battleships would merge. Size would push through the 60,000t barrier by the end of the decade.

In terms of cruisers, the RN may go for a three level solution: a small swing force of 9.2" heavy armoured cruisers, a small number of 7.5" or 8" medium cruisers and a large fleet of 8000t 6" economy light cruisers. The Japanese and USA would emphasise the 8" ships above all else, putting a spoiler in RN plans for avoiding the larger types.

Carrier fleets would still be largely experimental and in similar numbers.

Cruiser submarines were a dead end evolutionary path.

The IJN will hit major trouble with the Great Earthquake.
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Delta Force

I figure this is a good place to ask this, but I've seen a few references to producing more than one Vanguard class battleship on this site and others. Does this refer to a pre-war design distinct from the completed Vanguard, other ships of the Vanguard class (same type as actually produced), or a use of vanguard as a verb, describing any battleship built with old turrets and guns?
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Simon Darkshade
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
The idea was for a class of 5 Vanguard class battleships using old 15" guns. Same general type and dimensions, but with construction not delayed as with the historical ship.

http://s1.zetaboards.com/chumsofthedark/single/?p=249291&t=3590375

http://www.phpbbplanet.com/warshipprojects/viewtopic.php?t=190&mforum=warshipprojects

That second link does require being a member to read, but is full of relevant detail.
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Delta Force

Vanguarding ships is really something only the British could do, isn't it? No one else really had any surplus guns and turrets to start with, especially when you factor in them being a caliber useful in post-war naval combat.
Edited by Delta Force, May 25 2014, 06:23 AM.
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Simon Darkshade
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
There wasn't any foreign equivalent to the Rs around, so that is correct.

15", whilst old, was still more than effective enough to sink enemy ships, bombard land targets and even large enough to potentially be developed into an atomic round. That is good enough for me.
Edited by Simon Darkshade, May 25 2014, 06:47 AM.
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Vonar Roberts
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There was talk about the possibility of up-arming the Scharnhorst-class from 11" to 15". I'm not certain how close that plan ever got to fruition, and if there was no WNT they probably would have been designed as 15" or 16.5" battleships from the get go. No need to mess around with such a tiny caliber gun if everyone else is building much bigger all ready.

I'm sure if push came to shove with no WNT the Germans would have gotten around to building a improved version of the L-20a class battleship treaty restrictions be damned. The L-20a class probably would have been a standard middle of the road battleship design for the late 1920's time frame, and armed with either 15" or 16.5" guns.
Edited by Vonar Roberts, May 25 2014, 07:10 AM.
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Delta Force

Anyone have any information on maximum armor thickness and performance characteristics for 18 inch and 20 inch guns? I'm trying to simulate a few large battleships in Springsharp, but I haven't been able to find anything on armor and armament at the extreme end of things.
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Simon Darkshade
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There is an old file I have somewhere on Big Gun performance that I downloaded along with the Dos version of Springsharp/Springstyle. If I could find somewhere to upload it, that may be useful for broad simulation.

The British 18/40, the American 18/48 and Japanese guns have some details on Navweaps, but 18/50s and 20s are few and far between.
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Vonar Roberts
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Here's a question. What kind of a economic effect would continued battleship and battlecruiser construction into the 20's and 30's have on a nation's economy?

My theory is that the WNT really destroyed a lot of good shipbuilding and steel mill jobs, and directly contributed to the great depression being as bad as it was because of a lack of demand for large quantities of steel in other sectors.

For a practical case study example:
The 4 Admiral-class battle cruisers would have required 184,800 tons of steel. The 4 N3 class battleships would have required 196,000 tons of steel. The G3 class battle cruisers would have required 196,800 tons of steel. That's a combined 567,600 tons of steel that would half to be provided by the British steel industry that in our timeline was removed from the economy by the effects of the WNT.

The 4 Kii-class battleships would have required 170,400 tons of steel, the 4 Number 13-class battleships would have required 190,000 tons of steel. That's a total of 360,400 tons of steel removed from the Japanese economy.

The 6 South Dakota-class Battleships would have required 259,200 tons of steel, the cancelled Colorado class battleship would have required 32,600 tons of steel. That's a total of 291,800 tons of steel removed from the American economy.

This review of planned capital ship building that didn't happen because of treaties also doesn't take into account the hypothetical late 1920's successor ships to the WNT vessels that were cancelled in our timeline which could have very well been 15%-20% larger then the cancelled WNT classes of battleship, or the middle 1930's ships that would have succeeded those giants.
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Jacapo
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I'm not sure it is quite that simple to say it caused X% loss. You would have to do some research to determine the following:

1: Did any other industries receive a boost due to a large amount of steel being available?
2: Did civilian ship construction receive an uptick in production due to open shipyard capacity?
3: Did artillery manufacturers have more free capacity and design power to produce other weapons or civilian equipment (and thus further the field) that they otherwise wouldnt have had the need or want to produce?
4: Was the large amount of capital expense saved from not having to build a number of warships get invested in other areas, furthering the economy?

I don't know the answer to these questions for every nation, but I have no doubts that the Japanese government was saved a tremendous amount of debt and hardships by not having to build new battleships until the late 30's. Japan benefited greatly from being able to invest in Korea, Manchuria, and had capacity open to build one of the biggest merchant marine fleets in the world.
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Basil Fawlty
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Post Tenebras Lux
The assumption is that it is a zero-sum game, which is not usually the case in economics, especially in the guns-and-butter type of model that Jacapo mentioned. The United States produced 46 million short tons of raw steel in 1920 and nearly 62 million in 1929, an increase far larger than the loss of a few hundred thousand in shipping contracts.

The number of steel and iron structural shapes for construction increased by 40% in the 1920s, serving perhaps as a good indicator of where the rest was going.
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Simon Darkshade
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In the case of Britain it is:

1.) No.
2.) No, due to being saddled with the German merchant fleet.
3.) No, the merchants of death were pilloried and reduced, with artillery development being paralysed for a good 10 years or so.
4.) No, Montagu Norman and others contributed to the 20s being a decade of little real development. The government did run large surpluses in the period that could have covered the expense of the Cherry Trees.

It isn't so much the loss of steel which was redirected into other projects, but the loss of institutional memory, industrial capacity, performance and a general decline in heavy armaments production.

Britain lost a very large percentage of its construction capacity due to reductions in naval armaments and government-encouraged reduction of industry; Beardmores and Palmers are good examples.

The building pause lead to gaps in actively putting ship design into action. After Nelsol and Rodnol were completed in ~1927, the 10 year gap until the KGVs was very telling.
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Basil Fawlty
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Post Tenebras Lux
Ah yes, but of course, Britain had other things to do with its surplus, such as paying off debts.
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Simon Darkshade
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At the time, it was retiring a fair bit of debt, but had quite considerable surpluses that could have handled the cost differential between 2 Nelsons and 4 G3s in the first half of the 20s with bells on. The N3s would be a separate matter, but naval spending was cut considerably in the 1925-1934 period; a few million here and there and we suddenly get to real money.
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Vonar Roberts
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Indeed. The United States built the Empire State building, 40 Wall Street, and the Chrysler Building during the time that it would have been building those 7 Battleships that were cancelled as a result of the WNT. But aside from the 40% increase in domestic building steel use I'm not aware of any comparable great works in either the United Kingdom or Japanese Empire that would account for the steel use that the Battleships would have had. Germany would have the autobahn, but even that Steel would be limited to bridges and since they were not building battleships at the time they really don't count.

Here's a question for you, if there was no WNT and other naval powers are pumping out Battleships would the German's in the late 20's build a L-20a class battleship and lie about the actual tonnage of the ship if only just to present the image of keeping up with the major naval powers?
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Simon Darkshade
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No, they would not have done so. They did not have the design, the designers, the will, the guns nor the opportunity. Such a blatant violation of Versailles would get a reaction. The L20a was an obsolete design by that point; in the 1930s, designs started from the basis of the Bayerns.

As for British and Japanese steel use, it probably went to half a hundred rather prosaic and mundane uses. Half a million tons of steel over 5 years does get used up rather quickly; in the case of Japan, they had a fair bit of earthquake repair to be done.
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