| No USA Participation in WWII | |
|---|---|
| Topic Started: Oct 27 2012, 11:18 PM (296 Views) | |
| Basil Fawlty | Oct 27 2012, 11:18 PM Post #1 |
|
Post Tenebras Lux
|
Suppose that the USA adopted a policy in WW2 similar to Wilson's neutrality in WW1: neutral in thought as well as deed. There is no Lend-Lease, no Destroyers-for-Bases deal, no confrontation with German subs in the Atlantic, and no pressure on Japan. Consequently, there is no bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the United States remains out of the fray. What effect does this have on the British, and especially the Soviet war effort? A lot of the materiel and supplies on the Eastern Front came through Lend-Lease, so I'm wondering if it might not lead to a stalemate and possibly some eventual ceasefire along the lines of Brest-Litovsk. Where would that leave Britain, since it can't liberate France alone? |
![]() |
|
| Simon Darkshade | Nov 7 2012, 07:13 AM Post #2 |
|
Nefarious Swashbuckler
|
It would be exceptionally difficult to go on, but some sort of bomber campaign and fighting in the Mediterranean and Middle East would be the British approach. I'm not sure complete neutrality could last indefinitely. |
![]() |
|
| John | Feb 23 2013, 10:14 PM Post #3 |
|
Supposing that the United States could somehow manage to stay out of the war indefinitely, I think that the Soviet Union and the British would have been able to overcome Germany eventually. Whether or not they would have been able to stomach a war lasting until the late 1940s is another question. But, without US involvement, there is no oil embargo against Japan. Therefor, Japan focuses its full attention on fighting China. It doesn't attack Allied possessions in the east, at least not until MUCH later in the ATL. This allows the Allies to focus the resources that otherwise would have been held-up in the east, back to the west. Troops, equipment, and supply from these areas would proliferate to the European theatre and continue to do so having not been overrun by the Japanese. The Soviet Union would have struggled, but as we've seen from the past, the loss of Moscow is no bar to victory for the Russians. There is no reason to believe that this would be any different in 1943-44. Stalin is the kind of guy that would burn the city to the ground, along with useful infrastructure that couldn't be moved, and continue the fight to the east. Meanwhile, the harsh Russian winter would still have done to the Germans what it did to them in the OTL. All across German-occupied Europe, resistance groups and the final solution were eating up German troops with the duty of occupation and maintenance of order. The British and Commonwealth forces would have succeeded in the Middle East and Africa. They would have found a solution to stop the U-boat menace. And they would have prevailed in bombing the industrial heart of Germany. Germany could have worked on an A-bomb for another ten years and never would have managed to obtain one with the loss of the heavy water facility in Norway, which would still have happened, I think. I think that the war would have lasted into the late 1940s and the Allies would have forced a negotiated peace on Germany. What exactly that peace would have looked like is unimaginable, but it would not have involved continued German occupation of most of Europe. Edited by John, Feb 24 2013, 12:47 AM.
|
![]() |
|
| Vonar Roberts | Jan 30 2014, 12:52 AM Post #4 |
|
The United Kingdom didn't have that long, the U-boats were a menace in our timeline and England's supply situation was dangerously low well into early 1942. Without Lend Lease, Liberty Ships, or the Destroyers for Bases Donitz could have starved England into submission forcing the United Kingdom to sue for peace. Remember in 1940 the U-boats sank some 3,500 ships, 3,000 in 41, and 5,500 in 42 with the figure dropping off to less then 2000 in 1942 as the effect of the U.S entry into the war begins to take effect. this effect includes Liberty ships, more air power, access to German naval code, and access to better convoy escorts . 50 fewer escorts early on thank's to no Destroyer's for Bases means more unprotected convoy's which means more cumulative U-boat kills, and eventually England's starvation. So realistically your looking at kill ratios of 3,800 in 1940, 4000 in 1941, 5,800 in 1942, and probably somewhere in the neighborhood of 6,200 merchant kills in 1943 as Germany's submarine force reaches peak strength and efficiency and England's shipbuilding industry struggles to build enough merchants and escorts to outproduce the mounting wartime losses, and the Royal Navy struggles to protect England's very vulnerable lifeline. Afrika Corps would have been a German victory with the Germans being able to properly supply both the German forces and the Italians who were operating with obsolete equipment prior to this, and the overstretched British could have been pushed back into the Sinai. Crete would have fallen, and the Axis would have cut India and Persia's rich oil fields off from the rest of the Empire. If Hitler was smart he could have had ME-262's in 1941 as well, after all a single political decision for a fighter bomber instead of just going for a fighter forced the delay of the Me-262 production for several years. Edited by Vonar Roberts, Jan 30 2014, 12:55 AM.
|
![]() |
|
| Simon Darkshade | Jan 30 2014, 11:52 PM Post #5 |
|
Nefarious Swashbuckler
|
Not quite. The first happy time had been decisively ended and tonnage losses had dropped off dramatically. This had little to do with US intervention or support. They would pick up again after the US entry into the war due to the target rich environment off the US East Coast. The Destroyers for Bases agreement was not of great operational utility, given that most vessels needed lengthy refit periods prior to entry into service. By that time, British and Canadian production of frigates, corvettes, sloops and Hunts had significantly increased. Merchant vessels would still be ordered from the USA under cash and carry, as occured with the Ocean class. Bomber Command would be the initial loser, with aircraft redirected to the North Atlantic over 1941 and 1942. This is not necessarily a bad thing, with a smaller force of better types being a greater return on effort. Logistical limitations doom the Axis in North Africa. A lack of US overt support in 1940 and 1941 doesn't change the situation of Libyan ports and infrastructure. There weren't going to be Me-262s in 1941. England hadn't existed since 1707 and Britain was not fighting alone. A direct invasion is out, but in the same circumstances in @, there was confidence with very good reasons of knocking Italy out of the war in 1942 and continuing a long war against Germany. Extend things to 1947 or so, and Tube Alloys delivers over Berlin. I tend to agree with John regarding the Far East, with the Japanese window of opportunity reasonably narrow and the likelihood of the same set of circumstances occuring with a US concentration on the Far East quite small. By mid 1942, the correlation of forces in SE Asia would be decidedly different, which was a factor in Japanese planning. |
![]() |
|
| 1 user reading this topic (1 Guest and 0 Anonymous) | |
| « Previous Topic · Alternate History · Next Topic » |







8:39 AM Jul 11