| Early Cold War Without the Bomb | |
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| Topic Started: Jul 16 2011, 12:56 PM (378 Views) | |
| Basil Fawlty | Jul 16 2011, 12:56 PM Post #1 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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Let's say the Manhattan Project is a failure by 1945, owing to managerial missteps and insufficient investment (such as building only one nuclear reactor type, which doesn't work as planned). The outcome is that no atomic bomb is available by August to end the war in the Pacific early. As a result, the Soviet Union declares war on Japan on August 9 and occupies Manchuria and the entire Korean peninsula. LeMay's planned bomber assault on the Japanese transit system goes forward, which results in mass starvation in the home islands and approximately 1 million Japanese deaths by the winter of 1945. By this point Hirohito is ready to capitulate even if some die-hards in the army are not, and after the U.S. passes along quiet assurances that he will not be "removed" following the war, Japan surrenders. How does the early Cold War period (1945-49) unfold in the absence of nuclear weapons and the shock of Hiroshima? Is Stalin more openly aggressive in eastern Europe and Asia, using his preponderance of conventional ground forces as diplomatic leverage? What happens to U.S. perceptions of transatlantic security and American power? |
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| Simon Darkshade | Jul 17 2011, 04:22 AM Post #2 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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A greater emphasis on conventional airpower and strong forces could see less of a demobilization and continued battles between carrier/tactical airpower advocates and strategic bombing advocates. The US may be faced with the extremely unenviable task of keeping 1 million + men in Western Europe, supported by 2000 aircraft and with the necessary capacity to put in double that number; eventually, we would see the 1952 NATO goal set at Lisbon of 96 divisions being achieved. Probably a great deal more emphasis will be put on biological and to some extent chemical warfare. However, absent a major change in physical reality, the bomb will be available eventually. This actually makes it more likely to be used. |
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| Basil Fawlty | Jul 18 2011, 12:13 PM Post #3 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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I was thinking along much the same lines. The atomic genie will almost certainly be out of the bottle by 1950, and the lack of Hiroshima will greatly increase the likelihood of its eventual use. It'd be interesting to see what sort of popular debate would unfold, given the historical atom-mania. It wouldn't surprise me if some even argued the bomb would not be as devastating as imagined -- at least until after the first mock city attack. I can't see Stalin being any more cooperative than @, in spite of what some say about paranoia arising from the US's nuclear monopoly. However, political considerations may be more important in the short term than fear of retaliation. In any event the USSR was not prepared and did want to fight another war immediately after so much destruction. Would this result in a partial rearmament of Japan similar to W. Germany? Ground forces would not be as key, but a Japanese air force and small navy might be useful in the context of a Soviet dominated Korea. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Jul 18 2011, 12:57 PM Post #4 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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Japanese ground forces would free up US forces for other operations against Far East Russia and be able to protect valuable strategic air bases in Japan. The US isn't really in a situation where it would need to deal with the strategic uncertainty of Japanese air and sea forces when it can provide its own planes and ships, seeing that it will be paying for them and equipping them anyway. A conventional US strategic bombing war against the Soviet Union would take a lot more time and tonnage, but would do a lot of damage eventually, considering what several thousand medium/heavy bombers carrying 10 tons of bombs or incendiaries each could do over the course of a year or two, even before the real heavies come into service. The US, if faced with a real war, would have to mobilize on the scale postulated for Dropshot, or over 15 million men. Throw in a million Australians/New Zealanders, over a million Canadians, 2 million British and whatever can be scraped together from the rest of the Empire and Africa, and then add in several million Mexicans and South Americans. That is probably the force size needed to take on the 15-20 million of the Soviet Union and its satellites; extra Japanese and Chinese forces would definitely be handy. Edited by Simon Darkshade, Jul 18 2011, 01:03 PM.
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| Basil Fawlty | Jul 18 2011, 01:04 PM Post #5 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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What I meant was, the U.S. might take a more multilateralist stance, since it could not do the "heavy lifting" alone without an atomic arsenal. It definitely still would be out in front, but would not be able to win the war singlehandedly, to coin a phrase. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Jul 18 2011, 02:31 PM Post #6 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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There is some possibility that other forces would be needed to a larger extent. I'd call the overall requirements somewhere around 150% of Dropshot from @ for a counter-campaign. Building up Japan could occur over time, but this needs to be viewed in the context of a larger scale conflict that could occur any time between 1950-1954, with the atomic bomb seeing first combat use there. However, in the absence of such a conflict, an earlier Japanese rearmament could occur, to the level that was planned for around 1960-65 in @. |
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8:40 AM Jul 11