| Alternate Interpretations of Munich | |
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| Topic Started: Jan 17 2011, 05:08 PM (833 Views) | |
| Basil Fawlty | Jan 17 2011, 05:08 PM Post #1 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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The Munich Agreement is usually upheld as the epitome of everything bad about appeasement. It amounted to a betrayal of the Czechs, it was negotiated out of weakness, and it failed to stop a mad dictator from committing further aggression. In this sense it was not much different from a child facing a bully on a playground, and choosing to give up his lunch money in the hope that he'll be left alone in the future. Nonetheless, alternate interpretations of Munich exist. They usually involve arguments about Britain's unprepared state in 1938 and how another year of peace allowed a military buildup unhindered by bombing and convoy raiding. Something else frequently brought up is Hitler's anger at the end of the Munich conference, when he felt he'd been robbed of the war he desperately wanted. This, goes the argument, is evidence that Munich did help the Allies, though not in the way originally intended. What is your take on these alternate interpretations of Munich? |
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| Matthew | Jan 17 2011, 05:13 PM Post #2 |
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There was useful side effects, but I don't know if they outweighed the negative ones, after all the German army being slowed down in the Czech mountains instead of being able to race through the Polish plains is easily preferable, not to mention having, at the very least, a sympathetic USSR. Either way, sacrificing others who are not willing to sacrifice themselves, even for time, out of a lack of backbone and against all that is honourable and good, is never right. At any rate, that lot really thought it would be the last demand, so they would have no reason to buy time. Chamberlain was very shocked when Hitler went for more and thats what finally turned him around. |
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| JBK | Jan 17 2011, 05:17 PM Post #3 |
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I must say that I do not know alot about these different interpretations, but they do not seem very strong to me. The relative position of the allies was probably stronger during Munich than after it. Germany was at this point probably still out producing the allies in arms and weapons, so the one extra year would have given Germany a even bigger advantage over the allies in terms of materiel. Also, the position of the Royal Navy was much stronger:Bismarck and Tirpitz had not yet been completed. Finally the allies would have had the help of the entire Chech Army! Edited by JBK, Jan 17 2011, 05:17 PM.
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| Simon Darkshade | Jan 17 2011, 05:49 PM Post #4 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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Both Britain and France were in front of Germany in regards to general armaments, but needed the extra time to rearm properly and accelerate the process of establishing shadow factories, ordering ships, building the machine tools necessary for tank production. Some of the studies on this are quite detailed. Relative strength was always going to be heading upwards for Britain and France compared to Germany. The position of the RN was very strong, naturally, but if war holds off until 1942 - as was expected and planned for - then they are much, much stronger in every category. Munich did buy time that turned out to be vital. The Western Allies were simply not ready, nor did they have the necessary mindset to make war. Munich was, after all, incredibly popular. It wasn't the right thing to do at all, but sometimes good results come out of very bad decisions and bad situations. |
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| Steffen | Jan 17 2011, 06:52 PM Post #5 |
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It is an undisputed fact, that both the French and the British were ahead of Germany in terms of numerical availability of war material like tanks and aircrafts. But the fact which was not considered properly is that the material they used was mostly introduced in the early 1930's while the German tanks and aircraft were more modern. I do not intend to say that the Allied forces were not upgrading their military yet there was too less of modern equipment. On the opposite the German forces were build from the scratch. They used modern tactics like creating only tank units while the Allied forces assigned the tanks to infantry units. All this combined gave the Axis forces and advantage of roughly three years over the Allied forces. If they Munich wouldnt have been signed the war would have gone more unfavourable for the Allied Forces. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Jan 17 2011, 08:14 PM Post #6 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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There was plenty of fully modern equipment being introduced in 1938 and scheduled for further introduction through 1939 and 1940. The Spitfire and Hurricane come to mind, along with the 3.7", 2pdr, 40mm, 25pdr, Bren gun, not to mention naval weapons systems, heavy artillery, 9.2" heavy gun designs... Modernity was not something universally possessed by the Germans; that is one of the enduring zombie myths of WW2 history. In 1938, just as in 1940, the majority of German tanks were Panzer Is and IIs, with a sprinkling of IIIs and Czech tanks. They were outmatched one for one by the French Somua; the British Cruisers were not a factor. Production of the facilities and factories necessary to make modern equipment takes time, and there is a limit to what can be accomplished in peacetime. If there had been war over Munich, both the Allies and Germans would have been in great trouble. The type of war that would have eventuated would likely develop into a re-run of the Great War stalemate in the West for 18-24 months. Given two years, Britain and France would have the productive capacity to defeat Germany if used correctly; the main issue would be getting aid to the Czechs and getting Poland and Hungary onboard for a two front war. The best opportunity was the Rhineland. Edited by Simon Darkshade, Jan 17 2011, 08:20 PM.
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| Steffen | Jan 17 2011, 08:38 PM Post #7 |
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As I said there was modern equipment introduced in the years, yet the majority of the forces was still equipt with outdated material from the early 1930's as the reequipment phase was not completed. Modern stuff was available but not in the quantites the war required it. The French Somua was a good tank doubtlessly but with only 430 pieces build they were outnumbered by German tanks. It was just the same with the Sherman and the Tiger tank. The Tiger was the much better tank yet only to few were build to stand against the Sherman. The modernity of the forces was a huge asset for the German forces in the early stage of the war. Combined with a modern tactics the Allied forces had no chance to stand against the German sweeping through the Ardennes. Getting the Polish on the French and British side for a two side war is not only difficult but also nearly impossible. Would be much easier with the Czechs as they already were mobilised but were betrayed by the British and French, which gave Hitler enough time to increase war production which secured the German position in terms of strength of the air force and ground forces for almost three years. |
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| Basil Fawlty | Jan 17 2011, 08:53 PM Post #8 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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Not the Great War stalemate, but the Phoney War stalemate, I think. The French would have sat behind the Maginot Line and the Germans behind the Siegfried Line, until enough equipment was in order to launch Fall Gelb. The question is how industrial mobilization would proceed in the Allied nations, in light of the less-than-ideal mobilization in Sep. 1939 - May 1940, and accounting for political dissent that would have occurred from an earlier conflict. Would this shift the power ratio between Germany and the Allies enough for the Battle of France to turn out differently? |
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| JBK | Jan 17 2011, 08:58 PM Post #9 |
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If the allies went to war over Munich they would not have to deal with the same brilliant strategic plan. Sicelschnit was the main cause of the destruction of the allied armies. If a war had been fought in 1938 it most likely would have been fought on German terretory. The German high command was frightend by the idea of having the frontier with France almost completely open. The four motorised division which were supposed to guard the frontier during the invasion of Czechoslovakia were under armed and poorly equipped. The Germans also only had three (?) panzer divisions at this point, thus their strinking power was far less than that in 1940. If I remeber correctly Czech also had a mutual protective pact with the USSR. The only reason why the USSR never moved against nazi germany in 1938 was because the Poles refused to allow passage to the troops the Russians wanted to send to Czechoslovakia. Now, if Poland would have joined the allies which is quite likely we can also assume that there would have been some russian support for the Chechs. This, combined with the superiorety of France and Britain over Germany would have led to the rapid destruction of the German armed forces which had at this point not yet been able to learn the valuable lessons from the Polish Campaign. |
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| Steffen | Jan 17 2011, 09:36 PM Post #10 |
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It is correct that there were only three panzer divisions. But how many armoured divisions did the Allies fielded and how were they equipt. These units were not offensive but intended for defense. It is not very likely that the Allied forces would have been able to cross the Siegfried line as they lacked the proper equipment and training. The German forces on the opposite were used to fight a modern war as they gained lots of experience in Spain. Thats a very worthy asset. The Soviet Union would have never supported the Czechs because Stalin did not cared for the Czechs. He was interested in pushing his own country forward. Especially he gave orders to expand the military industrial complex with massive German assistance. Most of the tools and machinery the Soviet Union imported in the years from 1935 to 1941 were of German origin. Stalin knew that without these tools the Soviet Union would fail to defend itself in a German attack which - according to his opinion - may not take place before 1944. And until that the Germans would help the Soviet Union to gain military power. |
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| Matthew | Jan 17 2011, 09:43 PM Post #11 |
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Actually the Soviets did have a very good relationship with Benes and the Czechs, but of course the issue was how to get them there, Poland may not have let them across even if a war started, though I believe Roumania was mooted at one point as a way to get them involved. One of the things that pushed Stalin into Hitlers arms in the end was Munich and the lack of backbone on the part of the allies. It does not solve the problem though, and there would have to be a change of attitude on the part of the allied leadership in regards to Stalin, though if a war came I think they would not be against courting him. |
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| Steffen | Jan 17 2011, 09:56 PM Post #12 |
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But bear in mind the shape of the Soviet forces in the late 1930's. Though they were in a better shape than 1941 they would not have been able to stand a German offensive. Same applies for the Polish - which were at the level of the first world war. It would have been a horses vs. tanks situation. Due to the political attitude in that time, Hitler would have made the first step of a war anyway. So he would have attacked Poland to avoid the strong fortifications in the Sudetenland and then make a swing southwards. Pretty similar to the Sichelschnitt in the West. But even with Allies courting Stalin he was still dependent on the German know how and the exports. He knew that without this continous flow of knowledge of equipment the Soviet plans would quickly dry out. Similar situation after the second world war. The Soviet made a huge forward with the help of captured German scientists but after their knowledge was exhausted the Soviet Union was on the decline because the Soviet economy was not able to produce enough inventitions which were on a world-class level. |
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| Matthew | Jan 17 2011, 11:00 PM Post #13 |
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Keep in mind the USSR would not be facing a determined German assault in any fashion. Germany would be tied up trying to invade Czecholslovakia, and watching France and Britain in the west. If Poland comes in there is even less troops for Germany to utilise, though even without Poland, if Russia could get troops into Czechoslovakia via Roumania (something they would need to do either way), Germany is in quite a bit of trouble, at least in the sense their already unlikely offensive in Czecholslovakia is checkmated. This does not win the war, but it certainly bogs down into either WWI v2 or a Bore War variant. And at any rate, while the changeover would take time, the western allies would not be leaving the USSR hanging out to dry entirely if it meant their entrance into the war. Even if the Russians could not launch an assault on Germany, the simple fact that they could bring as many men to the table as they could, to be added to Czechoslovakia's, France's, Britain's, likely Roumania's and potentially Poland's changes things considerably. Even the Germany of 1939 and 1940 had to take on one enemy at a time. I don't see Germany of 1938 making any significant long term gains in any direction if she has to go to war over Munich. At any rate, this all assumes the USSR COULD get involved. I think she would, in the given circumstances, if she could find a way to bring her weight to bear. The question is how. Poland is more or less out, Roumania would seem to be the only option and how likely it would be, I do not really know enough to comment. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Jan 18 2011, 04:41 AM Post #14 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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What we are seeing here is a great deal of assumption and presumed knowledge. The Germans did not possess a monopoly on modern equipment but rather, were rearming from a very small initial base of not having leftover Great War stocks. The French were constrained by budget restrictions, and the British by a lack of a doctrinal requirement for another BEF until 1938/39, which impacted upon the scale of equipment production. However, condemning early 1930s equipment in 1938 is rather specious. It was the standard for all of the major combatants, and is akin to condemning the Littorios as obsolete ships because they were commissioned before the war. All parties were in the same boat regarding small arms; the main German AT gun was from the 1920s, as was their 105mm howitzer park, with the 150mm howitzers entering service in...the early 1930s. The tank parks were broadly similar. Mere numbers can't be used selectively either. One cannot say they are an unimportant thing regarding the Allies outnumbering Germany, but significant when confined to an individual tank type. It was the quality of the weapons, or their designs. It wasn't the quantity. It was they way they were used. The Poles could be bought into play through their agreements with the French and further pressure over the course of the war. The British and French were in no situation where they could have realistically assisted Czechoslovakia without the Soviets and Eastern Europeans. Mobilization for an effective offensive takes a long time. The Soviets were not incapable slackjaws utterly dependent on the wonders of German technology. They reaped the benefits after the Second World War, as did the Americans, but were perfectly capable of their own inventions, progress and development and showed it. German exports of machine tools were important to the Soviets, but also to the Germans for their hard currency returns Projecting what occured at various points in the historical Second World War is not the most relevant situation, as the strategic playing field is very different, the means of offensive war were not yet present and certain plans did not exist. Assuming that the 1940 offensive could be conducted in 1938 runs into trouble as firstly, it wasn't the German plan at the time; secondly, the forces weren't available; and thirdly, it ignores all friction and butterflies from an earlier war. Throw out preconceptions of the 1940 Battle of France and start over again with consideration of the forces available, the weapons and the operational plans. The Fall of France, far from being inevitable, was a close enough run thing in its key stages. The Spanish Civil War, whilst the closest point of reference, is not of huge utility in regards to examining the shape of potential higher intensity conflict. The elephant in the sitting room is the Nazi economy - it wasn't designed for long term effective functioning, and only survived with the benefit of plunder in 1939/1940. Delay war, and Germany hits some very big problems, and not just in regards to armaments production. In summary, Germany was not 'in front' in any sense in 1938 or 1940, but used its forces in new and effective ways; the Soviets cannot be underestimated or written off as entirely dependent on German largesse; and the course of any war would be different in 1938. Having said all that, any delay to war increases the power of Britain and France relative to Germany, in all manner of respects, including Tube Alloys. Munich was a blessing in disguise for the Allies, but also a lost opportunity and a circumstance where the wrong decision was made. |
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2:40 PM Jul 11