| Suez Crisis | |
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| Topic Started: Oct 17 2010, 12:21 AM (755 Views) | |
| Matthew | Oct 17 2010, 12:21 AM Post #1 |
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We were discussing this on MSN and we thought we might bring it here. Simon, do you know much about the US motivations for what they did? From the background on it, it really does seem astounding they would support Nasser, or at least, protect him as they did by their actions. I guess I just sort of gravitate towards Edens position for many reasons. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Oct 17 2010, 04:53 AM Post #2 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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The USA was trying to get Nasser and the other Arabs onside, combined with trying to displace Britain and France from their role as independent powers capable of acting in their own capacity, both in the Middle East and in general. The US position was based on an erroneous assumption that Nasser could have been got onside; Nasser and the other Arab nationalists did lean far more towards the Soviets and had a preference for them as a matter of course. The anti-colonialist/imperialist position of the US didn't really do them any favours, and resulted in severely damaging relations with two allies. It lay the groundwork for France effectively leaving NATO and knocked off Britain as a great power, which lead to a far more rapid retreat from the rest of Empire (leaving the disastrous mess that is Africa), abandonment of Commonwealth ties in favour of membership of the EEC (leading to the current broken Britain and the profound sense of self loathing encapsulated by many denizens) and accelerated the separate drift of Canada. The result was that the US had to do far more of their own heavy lifting and no one loved them any extra for it. To me, that is not a collection of positive results. However, there is a difference in mindsets. Hunt down the videos of the funeral of Churchill on YouTube, go to the section where Eisenhower is commenting, and listen to some of the ways he describes Britain and the British Empire; the undercurrent of distrust and Anglophobia has always been a feature of some parts of American political discourse, just as the same is true of British, European and other political discourse |
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| Basil Fawlty | Oct 18 2010, 02:44 PM Post #3 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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I don't know much about the affair but what I've read would seem to indicate that Eisenhower also genuinely opposed any attempt to use force to settle the crisis. Which would make sense given his changes in belief after having seen so much destruction in World War II, and then of course there's the Korean mess just three years before this. He also seems to have been particularly incensed about the British and French going back on their earlier word that force wouldn't be used. It was indeed strangely ironic considering Ike had so frequently been called a sellout to the British in WWII. It would not be fair to blame America for everything that happened with Africa later on, however. The outcome of Suez may have contributed to a culture of defeatism in Britain but the people have only themselves to blame for accepting and perpetuating it. I'm sure you'd both agree that another generation would have continued to fight to the end rather than run away from foreign responsibility. Anglophobia certainly has animated some sectors of US politics, however in my defense (since we have had so many misunderstandings) I do wish to say that I was never the slightest bit Anglophobic until I met Matt and you.
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| Simon Darkshade | Oct 19 2010, 07:17 AM Post #4 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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Eisenhower was no shrinking violet when it came to the use of force in US interests, or planning for and accepting the use of force (including atomic weapons) in said interests on many occasions in the 1950s. There was no other way to end the affair apart from the use of force to deal with Nasser. To the British and French, this was another Munich situation. The intent was always to employ force, and one of the major problems with the crisis and the issue of world opinion was not being able to immediately react with overwhelming force, but to have to wait for months while forces were scraped together. It was not so much a culture of defeatism in Britain so much as not being able to afford the manpower costs of Empire when refocused upon Europe, after the effective destruction of prestige and the apparatus of power at Suez. Defeat at Suez directly bought on the 1957 defence reappraisal, the abandonment of Imperial military commitments and the hastening of the Winds of Change. The US created the vacuum and then did nothing to fill it, outside of minor operations and dabbling in the Congo. At this time (1957), it was extremely clear which way the vast majority of African independence movements and leaders leaned, and that was very much towards Moscow. Cutting the brakes of the mechanisms that held them back pushed them forth into power much earlier than was wise, and before infrastructure and civil society had grown to the necessary extent to support an effective transition. The early 1950s plan was not for a pullout from Africa by 1963, but rather a much longer term transition. Similarly, whilst Algeria was a growing problem in 1957, it was not the existential crisis that almost ripped France apart and further diminished its ability to play its full part in the Western alliance; that only came with further support from Nasser and others emboldened by his success in defying the West. The US did not gain anything from Suez, save weakening two key allies and having to pick up many of their subsequent tabs, or go without their assistance. There is no other option that to accept reality when it is forced upon you by an ally willing to threaten, blackmail and use its full weight against you. It does not matter if there is all the positive attitude in the world; the charge of defeatism is, at best, a matter of oversimplification, erroneous labelling and overestimation of real capabilities. Much of the imperial game came down to seeming to be the great elephant/strong horse, rather than actually being able to back it up. The long term consequences of destroying British and French influence, the ability to project power and the political interest in doing so were not crystal clear at the time, but the lessons of previous years were - Burma, Ceylon, India. The removal of the bane of imperialism and concomittant British interest from those states did not result in fair deals, Western alliance nor wondrous progress. This is not to say that anything overt could have been done in the opposite direction, but there was a distinct willingness to believe the worst of British intent, discard real issues in favour quick solutions (be it manpower, bankruptcy, etc) and to look at matters in pure black and white. My comment on Anglophobia was entirely directed to the politicians of the time and subsequent times, both Republican and Democrat. There has always been a tendency in some parts of US discourse to remain figuratively in 1776, and ascribe naught but malign and mephistophelean machinations to the English/Limeys at the same time as decrying their ineptitude/insert other negative stereotype here.
Edited by Simon Darkshade, Oct 19 2010, 07:27 AM.
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| Matthew | Oct 19 2010, 02:41 PM Post #5 |
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I personally do think there was a major loss of spirit, whatever it would be called, defeatism, lack of vision etc. Suez was the straw that broke the camels back, so to speak. The losses in the Great War was the biggest blow, removing a lot of the competent individuals that would have been in power at the time, (Eden, after all, fought in that war as a captain, I believe). The second war brought about the financial difficulties. Suez broke the spirit and proved the naysayers right. No vision, no money, no spirit, and its no wonder that there was no will to resist the external pressure to ditch the Empire. It cannot be fully pinned on any one person or nation; the first two of the series came from us doing going beyond our duty unselfishly (and I suppose thats what makes the pill bitter to swallow) but there was a definite role the US played in bringing about the situation and indirectly causing the rest of the issues regarding the Empire. |
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| Basil Fawlty | Oct 20 2010, 03:28 PM Post #6 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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I would not say the U.S. had absolutely nothing to gain from Suez; it desired a greater influence in the Mideast, which it got, for better or worse. Eisenhower may have employed force to defend U.S. interests in other circumstances, but in this case he genuinely appeared to believe the application thereof was wrong, both morally and strategically: "The President was especially angry with Britain and France, for they had assured him that they would not use force. When he learned of the British bombing, he was furious with Anthony Eden... 'Bombs, by God,' he roared. 'What does Anthony think he's doing?' He telephoned Eden and gave him a tongue-lashing that reduced the Prime Minister to tears. When Ike heard that paratroopers were about to land, he exclaimed, 'I think it is the biggest error of our time, outside of losing China.'" Additionally, it was an election year and though Ike was ahead in the polls, domestic political considerations undoubtedly entered into the calculation. Whatever the case, his decision was apparently a popular one among Americans, so it was not one lone man grossly misjudging the situation. I suspect (again, I don't know a lot about the crisis itself, so I'm working from my knowledge in other areas) that the sudden Soviet interjection thrust the United States into an impossible situation. If we supported the French and British, we would be seen as a defender of imperialism, apparently reneging on our supposed commitment to the self-determination of peoples. I know we had a real "image" problem along these lines in the Pacific during the Second World War, particularly in India. So once the Soviets started using Suez for propaganda, the U.S. could not afford to sit by and let the Russians claim the high moral ground; similarly, if we let the intervention go forward without taking real steps to halt it, but only publicly denouncing it, the third world would begin to see little value in U.S. rhetoric and more easily interpret NATO as a veil for neo-colonialism. It seems like a lose-lose situation and Ike undoubtedly made a decision that he thought would have the best chance of not losing all of Arabia and Africa for us, as Simon mentioned earlier about Nasser. (As well as not starting a nuclear war with the Russians, a consideration we probably take too lightly these days, knowing how unlikely it was in retrospect.) The harshest criticism that may be leveled against the United States is this: that it did, as a superpower, what Britain had been doing for the past 150 years. Britannia was hardly the paragon of selfless duty that Matt claims, even as it is hardly the evil empire that Anglophobes like to paint. It looked out for its own interests above those of everyone else, including its allies. Whether the U.S. really stood to lose anything in this case by not intervening is open to debate, but it thought it did. Something I'd like to know more about is how the Canadian position ended up being what it was. I cannot believe it also was aimed at "knocking off" Britain and France and expanding American influence. Was it simply a case of pacifistic beliefs carrying the day? |
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| Matthew | Dec 16 2013, 12:10 AM Post #7 |
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So, in my fourth year level seminar on US Foreign Policy I had to write a 20-30 page essay on some aspect of US Foreign Policy. For a number of reasons I decided to examine the Suez Crisis in more depth. I got my paper back today and my prof seemed to think that it was decent enough, so I thought perhaps you'd all be interested. The first half deals with the chronology more directly, the second more with the argument that I was attempting to make. |
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| Petar | Dec 16 2013, 12:51 AM Post #8 |
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The General
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I'll give it a look once I have a bit more time. Engulfed by the fascinating world of Plato's theory on mimesis and how it shaped the literature right now.
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| Basil Fawlty | Dec 16 2013, 01:02 AM Post #9 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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I rather liked it and the second part, where you delve into the actions of each major player, is some of your strongest writing yet. It sounds to me like it comes down to this: America was the new power in the region and didn't like Britain and France acting without its say-so. ![]() In other news, I am now unfortunately quite convinced that a Suez-type crisis (not necessarily involving Suez) is inevitable between Simon and me in any of our future games. |
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| Matthew | Dec 16 2013, 03:27 AM Post #10 |
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And Britain and France didn't know why America particularly cared about them acting without their go ahead on the matter. I think I ended the entire thing rather too abruptly. I was up to page 16 with the draft and I finished the last of it on the last weekend before exams when all I wanted to do was to be done. Ah well, a full A means I did alright, I don't know if I've ever gotten an A+ on any major paper. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Dec 16 2013, 10:38 AM Post #11 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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I don't see the glaring areas of difference that would give rise to a Suez-type disagreement in anything post 1900, nor the lack of trust, communication and understanding IC, nor the direct clashes in interests. |
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| Basil Fawlty | Dec 16 2013, 02:42 PM Post #12 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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Well, more that it was a result of misunderstandings, and if something that enormous can happen because of a misunderstanding...
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| Simon Darkshade | Dec 16 2013, 03:03 PM Post #13 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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That is certainly possible, but preferably avoidable with clear channels of communication. |
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| Matthew | Dec 16 2013, 04:24 PM Post #14 |
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Oh, you used to have those all the time. I distinctly remember feeling, at times, like Canada in the British/US relationship.
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| Petar | Dec 18 2013, 12:33 AM Post #15 |
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The General
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Nice paper indeed. As Basil said, the outlines of the actions of the great powers and the probable reasoning behind them was especially well written. |
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| Matthew | Dec 18 2013, 12:34 AM Post #16 |
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Unless I decide to do an Honours thesis, its the biggest paper I'll write in my undergrad, so I'm sort of pleased with it. |
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| Petar | Dec 18 2013, 12:38 AM Post #17 |
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The General
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Humble as usual, are we? ![]() I'll post two of my own in a few weeks, once they are finished (taking a short break after the midterms). While one History paper is already determined (Phoenician religion and its impact on the Middle East in Antiquity), as well as one English paper (anything related to Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451), I still need to find a theme for one more History paper, and I'm not quite sure what to take. I'm taking any and all suggestions here. Was thinking something related to Austria-Hungary...
Edited by Petar, Dec 18 2013, 12:39 AM.
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| Matthew | Dec 18 2013, 12:42 AM Post #18 |
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Whats your scope for the history paper? Any period, any type of topic? I always found Metternich fascinating, you might write on him. |
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| Petar | Dec 18 2013, 12:45 AM Post #19 |
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The General
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In this case, I can pick any topic and period from any theme, so there's quite a lot of interesting stuff (I won't have such a wonderful opportunity anymore... but eh). Metternich was a good chap, he would be an interesting topic. Edited by Petar, Dec 18 2013, 12:49 AM.
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| Matthew | Dec 18 2013, 12:53 AM Post #20 |
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I also started reading a book, once, on the Rothschilds, they'd be an interesting topic. Or perhaps Ferdinand's plans for federalization. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Dec 18 2013, 01:18 AM Post #21 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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"Discuss the contention that Cleopatra had the body of a roll-top desk and the mind of a duck." (Oxford and Cambridge O-Level examination, 1976)
Edited by Simon Darkshade, Dec 18 2013, 01:19 AM.
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| Basil Fawlty | Dec 18 2013, 01:34 AM Post #22 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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What in the world...? |
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| Petar | Dec 18 2013, 01:37 AM Post #23 |
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The General
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That was my first reaction too... |
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| Simon Darkshade | Dec 18 2013, 03:54 AM Post #24 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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It is a line from a Rowan Atkinson comedy sketch where he is playing a schoolmaster. |
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| Basil Fawlty | Dec 18 2013, 05:02 PM Post #25 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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I see. I find the contention somewhat plausible. While I am not aware of roll-top desks being popular in first century B.C. Egypt, it is quite likely that she had the basic frame (body) of a desk somewhere about the palace. Likewise it is also possible that the head of a duck was mounted on the wall somewhere artistically. Not terribly plausible, but possible. |
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| Simon Darkshade | Dec 18 2013, 06:40 PM Post #26 |
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Nefarious Swashbuckler
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Marvellous! I never thought of it that way. Well played. |
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| Basil Fawlty | Dec 18 2013, 06:44 PM Post #27 |
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Post Tenebras Lux
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That's why we have these high-level academic discussions.
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Eisenhower_Eden_and_the_Suez_Crisis.pdf (156.97 KB)

2:39 PM Jul 11