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| Iran-US: A study in misperceptions | |
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| Topic Started: Jul 15 2008, 08:19 PM (239 Views) | |
| mynameis | Jul 15 2008, 08:19 PM Post #1 |
Internet Jujitsu
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Iran-US: A study in misperceptions By Hossein Askari WASHINGTON - In the popular media and even in learned journals and think-tank conferences, the failure of United States-Iran rapprochement is invariably blamed on Washington's insistence on a suspension of Iran's uranium-enrichment program and on Iran's intransigence on the same. While the obstinacy of both sides may indeed be the superficial cause of the breakdown in relations, the real reason is that neither side even tries to understand the other. The cynical reader may label me as naive to even think that politicians in the world's only superpower should care about understanding an adversary's perspective. To a cynic, there is nothing to understand. Power is might, and might makes right. The US has power and it will do as it wishes. End of story! But if the US is serious about negotiating with Iran, what does Washington need to understand about the Iran of today? What should it know about Iran's power structure? What is the input required of advisors and Iran experts for a US president and for other senior decision-makers? Do such advisors and experts even exist in the US? Does the US seek out such counsel? Given that US presidents and secretaries of state do not vet their "experts" to see if they can deliver what is needed, it would certainly seem they don't care to understand Iran. Consulting "experts" may simply be another opportunity for photo-ops or to lead a naive public to conclude that its leaders have taken the time to carefully consider important policies and decisions. Background to understanding Iran The Iran of today is nothing like the pre-revolutionary Iran. For those who knew Iran before the revolution of 1979 but have not visited since, you have to go back to Iran, spend significant time there, and talk with people from every walk of life to appreciate how it has changed. Reading about it does not allow you to absorb the dimensions of the change and the extent and intensity of beliefs and views. Iran's population has about doubled since 1979, to 70 million. The country, especially the large cities, has become crowded, with no elbowroom for the average person. Open spaces have become more limited and less accessible for the typical person to enjoy. Pollution has increased. Employment opportunities are not good for the average man and woman. Real per capita incomes are about what they were at the time of the revolution, nearly 30 years ago, and income distribution has not improved. Inflation is about 30% per year. All in all, it's a depressing picture. Iran's population is young, with a median age of about 26 years. They know little about the former ruler, the shah, and his era. Instead, they vividly know what has happened since 1979. They care little about the many international concerns of the government, such as the Arab-Israeli impasse. Higher oil prices have not improved the daily lives of most Iranians and the government has not, and most probably will not, adopt the reforms and economic policies to achieve sustained and rapid growth. The young educated class is primarily concerned with good employment opportunities. But the outlook for university graduates is dim. And most importantly, the hope for a better economic future is rapidly dying for a large majority of Iranians. Young educated Iranians are leaving the country in droves, at an enormous cost to Iran. While Iranians have not faired well economically and largely, and correctly, blame their government for most of their economic misfortunes, due to corruption, waste, short-sighted and inconsistent policies, inefficient institutions and more, they blame the outside world, especially the United States and Western Europe, for much of their human suffering. Understanding this fact is essential to understanding Iran's attitude towards the outside world and the West. A brief snippet of recent history from an Iranian perspective (after all, that's what matters if you want to understand Iran, not the Western view of Iran's history) is needed to appreciate the context of the average Iranian's frustration with the West. Iran and Iranians (and not just those who oppose the mullahs) feel more insecure and victimized than at any time since World War II. Where does this sense of insecurity and victimization come from? The US and Britain overthrew the constitutionally elected government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, along with the West's subsequent support for Saddam Hussein, shaped and molded the Iranian psyche and affected their attitudes toward the West, and especially toward the United States. The acquisition of nuclear technology (that could lead to the development of nuclear arms if necessary) may become an increasingly popular policy in the eyes of the average Iranian. Why? After Saddam invaded Iran, the United Nations and the West took no serious diplomatic actions against this aggression. The reasons are clear. First was the fact that on November 4, 1979, Iranian students had attacked the US Embassy in Tehran and taken 52 Americans hostages. The US did not consider this egregious act on the part of Iranian students as a possible reaction to the overthrow of the legitimate government of Iran by the US and Britain; the students may have felt that history was about to repeat itself. The Iranians were wrong to have taken hostages, but at the same time one should note that they felt their entire nation had in effect been held hostage by the US since 1953. Western presumptions of Iranian religious expansionism were another factor in the West's support of Iraq at that time. During the course of the bloody eight-year war, Saddam used US and European-supplied biological and chemical weapons to kill and maim Iranians in the thousands, while the West embargoed the sale of even conventional weapons to Iran and supplied Iraq with all its needs, including satellite intelligence from the US. The result was that over 500,000 Iranians died and even more were injured, with many permanently disabled from biological and chemical weapons. Most, if not all, Iranian families have been touched by the tragedy of this senseless war of aggression. As a result, average Iranians, not just the mullahs, painfully learned what it was to be vulnerable to external aggression. The UN and international agreements do not provide peace of mind for Iranians. To the majority of them, and not just the government in Tehran, the international rule of law is only a phrase used by the powerful to justify the imposition of their will on the rest of the world. Then came the first Gulf War in 1991, with Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. While Iran played a positive role, not only did it not receive any recognition, it was excluded from the ensuing regional US-sponsored security arrangements that included even far-away Egypt. Iran did not receive any war reparations from Iraq. The US further alienated Tehran by opposing Iranian participation in Caspian Sea oil development. In addition, US economic sanctions on Iran were further tightened to change Iranian policies to support US wishes. The first Gulf War was followed by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan on Iran's eastern border in late 2001. Again, here was an opportunity for quiet rapprochement between Iran and Washington; after all, Iran had supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance throughout the Taliban rule and had accepted over 2 million refugees. But Iran was to be disappointed once more. Iran did not receive positive recognition and was instead labeled a founding member of the so-called "axis of evil" by President George W Bush; this further alienated average Iranians (not just the mullahs) and made most Iranians feel less secure. During the second Gulf War, that is, the invasion of Iraq by US-led forces in 2003 to topple Saddam, Iran did not appear to interfere to the degree it could have in Iraqi affairs, especially in the Shi'ite south, where it has significant influence. But again, the rhetoric against Iran continued. Now, the US surrounds Iran on all sides. Remember, this is the same US that has not upheld the international rule of law, that allows the provision of banned chemical and biological weapons to client countries, that reserves the right to overthrow regimes, invades countries that pose no threat, that does not follow the Geneva Convention and that has been belligerent toward Iran for many years. Is it really so difficult to understand why Iranians feel insecure and blame the West for much of their suffering? While many, or even the majority, of Iranians may not support the mullahs, Washington's record hardly inspires confidence. It may surprise some readers that the majority of Iranians are aware of these historical facts and that these same facts are an integral part of the Iranian psyche. Western pronouncements and claims in support of democracy and human rights are seen as duplicitous at best. Iranians are more engaged in the impact of foreign relations on their daily lives than are Americans of the same educational standing. Iranians have to be informed and engaged because their lives have been greatly affected by outside forces. The average American, fed by the popular media, sees Iranians as people who hate the US and who call it "The Great Satan". Americans see Iranians as terrorists and as supporters of what they believe to be terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. What is sad and dangerous is that the view of policymakers is hardly any better than this media-driven and superficial level of misunderstanding and comprehension. US belligerence toward Iran has not only stiffened the regime in Tehran but it has afforded it a much longer lease on life, motivating Iranians to defend what they see as their dignity and their rights as an independent nation. A major source of legitimacy for the regime in Tehran in the eyes of Iran's citizenry is the fact that it has stood up to the US. Had the shah been wise enough and had the backbone to stand up to Washington, we might never have witnessed an Iranian revolution. Iran's power structure Western observers of Iran invariably complain that, on top of everything else, it is difficult to have a meaningful dialogue with Iran because it is unclear who runs or speaks for the country. This lack of insight is absolutely understandable when one looks at how Washington deals with countries under absolute rule, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. But for most other countries, no one person can always deliver on what he or she says or signs. In fact, even US presidents cannot deliver on their signature. Can a US president commit the US to the Kyoto Treaty or the International Court of Justice? I could go on. The point is that it is easy to know who speaks for a dictatorship on every issue, but not for other forms of government. Moreover, in the case of Iran, such frustration is an indication of ignorance and bias. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's unreported and private frustration with a letter from Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and an emissary from Iran's Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is merely a sign of Western ignorance. The same set of facts in the case of an ally would be labeled as a sign of a "thriving" democracy or the "birth pangs" of democracy. I must repeat the obvious about the functioning of the Iranian government: as is the case in most other countries, no single person in Iran commands universal loyalty and no single person is the national spokesperson on all issues. The Supreme Leader may set the broad policy agenda, but he does not dictate policy. Just look at the Iranian economy under Ahmadinejad. It is a total mess (as was the case even before Ahmadinejad, though less so). Its policies and practices are just off the wall. Ahmadinejad does not even follow the law of the land; the Iranian government is supposed to adhere to the disposition of oil revenues, replenishing the Oil Stabilization Fund when revenues are high and weaning the government from oil revenues over a period of 10 years. Instead, Ahmadinejad spends oil revenues freely, in many instances without parliamentary approval, to support his own political base. The Supreme Leader devoted almost his entire Iranian new year address in 2008 to Iran's economic failures and the need for urgent reforms. While the Supreme Leader may be clearly disappointed with Iran's economic performance and the increasing economic injustice under Ahmadinejad, he does not see it as his role or in his interest to interfere directly in the day-to-day running of the government. Instead, he tries to blunt, shape and change the president's policies (or parliamentary debate) through carefully worded speeches, by acting through members of parliament and especially through the speaker of parliament, individual clerics and through the powerful oversight body, the Guardian Council. If the Supreme Leader absolutely wants to change a particular policy, he clearly can in today's Iran, but he has largely chosen not to as this would bring him into the fray and expose him to guilt by association in the case of unpopular policies and failure, and to widespread criticism. In Iran, the president develops and implements policies. He is not the ultimate head of state. Also important is the fact that there are other checks and balances to his power: the parliament, the Guardian Council, the military (including the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps - IRGC), and the security services. The president selects his cabinet, but needs parliamentary approval before members of his cabinet are installed in office. Ministers are by and large powerless to adopt any major change in policy on their own; and deputy ministers are basically afraid to take any decision without approval of their minister. The Iranian parliament, or Majlis, holds lively debates and passes laws that may not please the president or the Supreme Leader. But bills passed by the Majlis do not become law unless approved by the Guardian Council (12 members - six clerics and six jurists). In effect, the Guardian Council holds veto power over all legislation adopted by the Majlis. It can veto bills if it deems that these are contrary to Islamic law or to the constitution. While all 12 members vote on the laws being compatible with the constitution, only the six clerics on the council vote on compatibility with Islamic law. Bills found lacking are sent back to the Majlis. If the Guardian Council and the Majlis cannot resolve their differences, then the matter is sent to the Expediency Council for final resolution. The role of the military (including the IRGC) in Iran goes beyond the military's standard role in most other countries, that of defending the country against external threat and aggression. This is because the sacrifices of the military during the Iraq war are important to most Iranians, especially those who are roughly 40 years of age and older, people who were directly and in their own lifetime touched by the war. Although the IRGC reports to the Supreme Leader, the support of the IRGC in particular carries a great deal of sway in Iran. In recent years, and especially under Ahmadinejad (himself a former member of the IRGC), the IRGC has increasingly secured lucrative civilian government contracts, enhancing its economic importance at the expense of the private sector and overall economic performance. In Iran, as in a number of other countries, the security services are outside of the control of elected leaders and defy their oversight. Iran's security services are directly under the control of the Supreme Leader and his office. They are a force that no president controls and a force that can limit and override presidential powers in areas of foreign policy and national security, in ways that are hardly ever transparent, even to those inside Iran. In the case of Iran, because of regional conflicts and the massive US presence with regime change in Iran as its policy, the security services are afforded even more latitude and deference than in most other countries. Many of the US complaints about the lack of transparency in Iran may simply be Washington's inability to penetrate Iranian security services. If so, Iranians are doing their jobs well. While most Iranian clergy have left Iran only to visit the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the majority of the key technocratic decision-makers continue to be Western educated. But these post-revolutionary leaders who came to the West (especially to the US) for their university education, viewed their educational goals much more narrowly and returned to Iran as soon as their formal education was completed. Making contact A crash course in Diplomacy 101 would tell a US president that he or she needs top-notch advisors if the US wants to have successful negotiations with another country. These advisors should have the background and experience to brief and advise a president at every step of the negotiations. In the end, negotiations are akin to a game of poker. Knowledge about the adversary (history, culture, upbringing, etc) is key in helping to understand an adversary's goals, motivation, limitations and strengths. Equally important, one must intimately know the individuals who are in positions of power, the decision-makers and those who are negotiating. Negotiations are always with individuals. Where are these individuals in the Iranian power structure? What are their guarded views on a broad range of issues? What is their personal background? How can one interpret their reactions and mannerisms? All of this information is necessary if one is to have the advantage in a game of poker. But such knowledge requires intimate contact over time with a number of people with whom Americans (American-born or Iranian-born) have little or no contact. In some cases, such as a very senior member of Iran's intelligence services, Americans would not even know whom they were meeting. Does the US have a cadre of advisors and experts that could provide briefings embracing these and other aspects of background information for negotiating with Iran? Since September 11, 2001, there has been a proliferation of Middle East experts on everything from Islam, terrorism, and yes, on Iran. It is on these newly minted policy experts on Iran that US decision-makers (the White House, Congress, the State Department, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency) ostensibly rely for guidance and direction in dealing with Iran. Who are these Iranian experts? They fall into two broad groups: those of Western origin and those of Iranian origin. In the case of those of Western origin, many speak very little or no Farsi, some have never visited Iran, most have not visited Iran since the revolution, even fewer have met a broad spectrum of Iranians in Iran and none to my knowledge have gone to Iran to interact with senior clergy, cabinet ministers, members of parliament and Iranian national security leaders on anything remotely approaching a regular basis. So do we have any US-born experts on Iran? In the case of Iranian-born experts living in the US, again many have not visited Iran since the revolution and have thus not had an opportunity to interact with a broad spectrum of the populace. I would venture to say that not even a handful has had extensive interactions with senior clergy, cabinet ministers and Iranian national security leaders. Many Iranian Americans publicly appear to be more American than Americans; and this invites suspicions of their impartiality in Iran. Mostly critical, many Iranian-born Americans have their own personal agenda (as did perhaps Ahmad Chalabi in the case of Iraq); they dream of going back and recovering their lost wealth, or even better, ruling the country and getting even more wealth than they had before the revolution and thus become susceptible to Iranian manipulation. They may have accepted money from the Iranian government or comprised their public views and opinions to secure financial rewards. So are there even a handful of learned and trustworthy Iranian-American experts on Iran? How should advisors and experts be vetted? How can this be rectified? How can a US president or secretary of state get better advice? Whether there are legitimate experts and advisors on Iran in the US has yet to be determined, but at least the government should try to assess their qualifications as many lives and US welfare may depend on their advice if they are listened to and their advice is taken. For anyone who is consulted by the US government as an expert on Iran the following information, in addition to normal information contained on a resume, should be disclosed: level of competence in the Farsi language; course of study in areas such as history, politics, religion and economics specifically about Iran; writing and research on Iran; aggregate time spent in Iran, and the number, nature, length and dates of visits to Iran; names and nature of relations with key leaders, decision-makers and especially those in security services; whether they, or their family, have accepted or are seeking financial return and rewards in Iran; and reasons why there might be a remote chance of a possible conflict of interest (financial, professional or otherwise) on policy recommendations or predictions. Does the US government even care about the quality of advice? Do the White House and other branches of the US government even bother to ask, let alone demand, this kind of information of individuals on whom the lives and fortunes of the US depend? Or are experts just chosen because of a book, a professional article or appearances on TV and radio? Given that there's so much at stake, do the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, other US government agencies or the US Congress vet these "experts?" My answer to this question would be an emphatic "no", knowing some of the "experts" who have been doing some of these high-level briefings on Iran at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Given this state of affairs, it is no wonder that no progress has been made in enhancing US-Iranian relations for nearly 30 years. The process has been akin to the blind leading the blind. Can US efforts at rapprochement be even considered as serious? All the while, the average Iranian feels increasingly threatened by the US presence in Iraq and is becoming more and more nationalistic as the US president continues to publicly threaten Iran with his various options, including military action. US public threats against Iran only re-enforce Iranian nationalism, lend further support to the mullahs in Teheran, and are in turn a sign of how little US policymakers and US "experts" on Iran understand Iran. It seems that in Washington the basis for dealing with Iran will continue to be the appropriate mix of carrot and stick with little understanding of the possible reaction of the intended recipients of the carrots and sticks. In the end, the cynics may be right: experts and advisors are only pawns, pawns in a charade that justifies the politicians' endgame, with true expertise and understanding beside the point. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JG16Ak01.html Edited by mynameis, Jul 15 2008, 08:26 PM.
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