Welcome Guest [Log In] [Register]
Add Reply
Evans V. Durham; "Duke students not a protected class"
Topic Started: Mar 31 2011, 07:28 PM (338 Views)
Quasimodo

Quote:
 


Further, with respect to the “recognized classes of persons” protected by § 1985, the
Supreme Court has noted that § 1985(3) was adopted in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act
in order to “combat the prevalent animus” against blacks and their supporters. United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836, 103 S Ct. 3352, 3360, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1049 (1983).

Given this statutory purpose, the Supreme Court has further noted that “it is
a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus” other than
animus against blacks and “those who championed their cause.”
Id.; see also Harrison v. Kvat
Food Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 157-61 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that § 1985(3) was “enacted to
fulfill a particular purpose and designed to meet particular conditions,” in 1871 to afford “a
remedy for the vindication of the civil rights of those being threatened and injured, notably
blacks and advocates for their cause” and that “the original objective of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act and § 1985(3) was the protection of blacks and their supporters in the South” ).

Although
the Supreme Court has not definitively identified all of the “recognized classes of persons” for
purposes of § 1985(3), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted that “the class
protected can extend no further than to those classes of persons who are, so far as the
enforcement of their rights is concerned, ‘in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the
victims of Klan violence.’
” Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1258 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 851, 103 S. Ct. at 3368); see also Harrison, 766 F.2d at
161 (noting the Supreme Court’s “lack of enthusiasm for expanding the coverage of § 1985(3)
to any classes other than those expressly provided by the Court”); Phillips v. Mabe, 367 F.
Supp. 2d 861, 873 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (noting that “[p]laintiffs have standing under § 1985

only
if they can show they are members of a class that the government has determined ‘requires and
warrants special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights’”
(citations omitted)).

Thus,
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have narrowly interpreted
the “recognized classes of persons” who may bring § 1985 claims, and this Court is bound to
follow that interpretation in the present suit.


Applying these standards in the present case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not
alleged that they were in a classification entitled to protection under § 1985(2) or § 1985(3). In
the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they were “undergraduate student(s)
enrolled at Duke University” and that they were members of the Duke men’s lacrosse team.

However, based on the case law set out above, it is clear that “Duke students” or “Duke
Lacrosse team members” are not classes entitled to protection under § 1985.
Cf. McGee v.
Schoolcraft Cmty. Coll., 167 Fed. Appx. 429, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that a group of
individuals seeking an advanced degree is not a class entitled to special protection under
§ 1985(3)); Lewin v. Cooke, 95 F. Supp. 2d 513, 525-26 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that a class
of students does not qualify as a class entitled to § 1985(3) protection); Murphy v. Villanova
Univ., 520 F. Supp. 560, 561-62 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same); Crain v. Martinez, No. 93-942-CIVORL-22, 1994 WL 391672, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 1994) ) (same); Naglak v. Berlin, No. 87-
3427, 1988 WL 30920, at *4 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 1988) (same); see also Upah v. Thornton Dev.
Auth., 632 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding that a class composed of out-of-state
residents is not a class within the protection of § 1985(3)); Korotki v. Goughan, 597 F. Supp.
1365, 1374 (D. Md. 1984) (same); Ford v. Green Giant Co., 560 F. Supp. 275, 277-78 (W.D.
Case 1:07-cv-00739-JAB -WWD Document 133 Filed 03/31/11 Page 62 of 9818
The Court notes that the decision in Waller v. Butkovich, 605 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C.
1985) cited by Plaintiffs, did not directly address this question, and in any event was based on
reasoning that was subsequently repudiated by the Fourth Circuit in Buschi, 775 F.2d 1240, and
Harrison, 766 F.2d 155. In addition, the Court further notes that this Court’s previous decision
in Phillips v. Mabe did not address the question of whether a § 1985 claim could be based on
alleged discrimination against whites as a class; instead, Phillips involved § 1985 claims brought
Wash. 1983) (same).

Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiffs do not allege in the Second Amended
Complaint that they are members of any racial class, but in the Consolidated Response,
Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged race discrimination as “white plaintiffs.” However,
the § 1985 claims based on this contention fails for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court and
Fourth Circuit have indicated an intent to limit the protections of § 1985 to discrimination
against “those classes of persons who are, so far as the enforcement of their rights is concerned,
‘in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence.’
” Buschi, 775
F.2d at 1258 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 851, 103 S. Ct. at 3368); see also
Cloaninger v. McDevitt, No. 106cv135, 2006 WL 2570586 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2006) (“As
recognized by the controlling law in the Fourth Circuit, the only class of persons protected by
Section 1985(3) are African Americans.”
(citing Harrison, 766 F.2d at 161-62)); Stock v.
Universal Foods Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 (D. Md. 1993) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim
because plaintiff, as a white male, was not a member of a class that has suffered historically
pervasive discrimination);
Blackmon v. Perez, 791 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(dismissing § 1985(3) claims by white plaintiffs because “plaintiffs do not represent a class of
persons who [do] not enjoy the possibility of effective state enforcement of their rights”
(internal quotations omitted)).
by a white plaintiff who alleged discrimination based on his efforts to protect the interests of
black students, and the Court concluded that the plaintiff was not a member of a protected class
and did not have standing to assert § 1985 claims there. See Phillips, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 873-74.


Second, even if the Fourth Circuit decided to extend § 1985 to additional classes of
persons, including ‘white plaintiffs’ as a class, Plaintiffs here have not sufficiently alleged facts
in support of such a claim. When a plaintiff attempts to assert a conspiracy claim pursuant to
§ 1985(2) and § 1985(3), the Fourth Circuit has made clear that the purported conspiracy must
be alleged in more than just a “conclusory manner,” and must include allegations of “concrete
supporting facts.” Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377. “[c]ourts have thus required that plaintiffs
alleging unlawful intent in conspiracy claims under § 1985(3) or § 1983 plead specific facts in
a nonconclusory fashion to survive a motion to dismiss.” Gooden v. Howard County, 954
F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Jenkins v. Trs. of Sandhills Cmty. Coll., 259 F. Supp.
2d 432, 445 (M.D.N.C. 2003).

In this case, the Court finds that the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint would state a claim only for discrimination against them as “Duke
Students” by Defendant Gottlieb or for personal political gain by Defendant Nifong.

Thus,
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that would establish intent by the Defendants to discriminate
against whites as a class, or intent to injure Plaintiffs or deprive them of their rights because
they were white. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 267-72, 113 S. Ct. at 758-60 (holding that plaintiffs must
establish as an element of the cause of action that the conspirators were motivated by a purpose
to discriminate against a recognized class of persons).

The Second Amended Complaint does
include a conclusory allegation that “one or more Defendants” engaged in acts that were
“motived by invidious racial animus, intended to foment invidious racial animus against

Plaintiffs in the Durham community and/or intended to take advantage of the invidious racial
animus that they had fomented in the Durham community against Plaintiffs.” (Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 448, 463).

However, this allegation includes several conclusory alternatives without
any definite or specific allegations, and in any event this contention is simply not supported by
any factual allegations to support a claim that Defendants were motivated by a purpose to
discriminate against whites. Cf. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2006)


(dismissing allegations as “conclusory” in a claim of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 where the plaintiff alleged simply that race was a ‘motivating factor’ in the action taken
against him“without explaining how that conclusion is consistent with the allegations,” since
“it is the alleged facts supporting those words, construed liberally, which are the proper focus
at the motion to dismiss stage”).

In addition, an allegation that “one Defendant” acted with
racial animus is insufficient to allege a conspiracy in which all of the conspirators were
motivated by a shared intent to discriminate on the basis of race.
Cf. Simmons, 47 F.3d at
1378; Martin v. Boyce, No. 1:99CV01072, 2000 WL 1264148, at *7 (M.D.N.C. July 20, 2000)
(noting that for claims under § 1985(3), “all of the conspirators must share the same forbidden
animus” and “when only one conspirator is motivated by a forbidden purpose, there can be no
meeting of the minds, no agreement, to deprive another of the equal protection of the laws
based on his race”).

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under
§ 1985(2) or § 1985(3) because Plaintiffs are not members of a “recognized class of persons”
entitled to protection under § 1985 and because even if they were members of a recognized

(NOTE:) The Court notes that to the extent Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their
constitutional rights, the Court has already recognized the ability of Plaintiffs to pursue those
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without having to establish membership in a protected class
or class-based discrimination by Defendants. However, the sections of § 1985 at issue here are
very limited in scope.
As such, the claims alleged in this case are simply not within the limited
scope of those particular provisions of § 1985, at least as those sections been interpreted by the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit.


class of persons, they have failed to sufficiently allege racial or other class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus as the purpose of the alleged conspirators’ action. Counts 8, 9, and 10
will therefore be dismissed as to all Defendants.
,
Edited by Quasimodo, Mar 31 2011, 07:29 PM.
Offline Profile Quote Post Goto Top
 
Quasimodo

Quote:
 
First, the Supreme Court and
Fourth Circuit have indicated an intent to limit the protections of § 1985 to discrimination
against “those classes of persons who are, so far as the enforcement of their rights is concerned,
‘in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence.’
” Buschi, 775
F.2d at 1258 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 851, 103 S. Ct. at 3368); see also
Cloaninger v. McDevitt, No. 106cv135, 2006 WL 2570586 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 3, 2006) (“As
recognized by the controlling law in the Fourth Circuit,
the only class of persons protected by
Section 1985(3) are African Americans.”
(citing Harrison, 766 F.2d at 161-62)); Stock v.
Universal Foods Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 (D. Md. 1993) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim
because plaintiff, as a white male, was not a member of a class that has suffered historically
pervasive discrimination);
Blackmon v. Perez, 791 F. Supp. 1086,



I know there is a prevalent view among African-Americans that civil rights laws were not passed
for "white men and do not apply to them";

and that they also do not apply to persons who are not members "of a class that has suffered historically
pervasive discrimination";

but we do not have two types of laws in this country.

"Equal protection of the laws" means what it says, or else it is a chimera.

And if a race-based hate group (the Black Panthers) making death threats inside
a courtroom and threatening to bring "their own kind of justice" is not akin
to Klan violence, then what is?



Edited by Quasimodo, Mar 31 2011, 07:40 PM.
Offline Profile Quote Post Goto Top
 
Quasimodo

Quote:
 

[citing another ruling as justification for dismissing the count] :

“[p]laintiffs have standing under § 1985

only
if they can show they are members of a class that the government has determined ‘requires and
warrants special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights


So in the future federal assistance under # 1985 in protecting the civil rights of injured victims
will not be forthcoming if they belong to the wrong group or class?

(We all know that the feds did nothing to assist in protecting the civil rights of the Duke students.)
Offline Profile Quote Post Goto Top
 
1 user reading this topic (1 Guest and 0 Anonymous)
« Previous Topic · DUKE LACROSSE - Liestoppers · Next Topic »
Add Reply