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The bankruptcy stall; doesn't Judge Beaty know the law?
Topic Started: Mar 30 2011, 07:52 AM (584 Views)
Quasimodo

(hat tip: tidbits)

Quote:
 
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-1003
________________
In re: Denise Irene Patch,
Debtor.
____________________
Bryan Blocker, Trustee for the
Heirs and Next-of-Kin of Dillon
Bryan Blocker,
Appellee,
v.
Denise Irene Patch,
Appellant.

Appeal from the United States
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Eighth Circuit.
[PUBLISHED]
________________
Submitted: November 16, 2007
Filed: May 29, 2008 United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-1003
________________
In re: Denise Irene Patch,
Debtor.
____________________
Bryan Blocker, Trustee for the
Heirs and Next-of-Kin of Dillon
Bryan Blocker,
Appellee,
v.
Denise Irene Patch,
Appellant.

Appeal from the United States
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Eighth Circuit.
[PUBLISHED]
________________
Submitted: November 16, 2007
Filed: May 29, 2008


Quote:

Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts certain debts from discharge
in bankruptcy, including debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity."


To establish that a debt is nondischargeable consistent with this
exception, the party seeking to prevent discharge must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the debt is for both "willful . . . injury" and "malicious injury." Id.;
see Fischer v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171 F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir.) ("Willful
and malicious are two distinct requirements . . . ."), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999).

The meaning of "willful" under § 523(a)(6) is controlled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).2 There, the Court
resolved a circuit split over the meaning of "willful," holding that "debts arising from
recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of
§ 523(a)(6)." Id. at 64. Because the word "willful" in § 523(a)(6) modifies the word
"injury," the Court concluded that "nondischargeability takes a deliberate or
intentional injury,
not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury." Id.

[Maybe in the interests of the judicial economy of the bankruptcy court, Judge Beaty
should have put off Nifong's bankruptcy process until after it was determined whether
or not his actions were "willful" and "malicious".

Or in that same interest, he could just have put off the process until it was known whether or
not Nifong would actually have $180 million in liabilties... :SarC: ]


(snip)

The scope of "willful . . . injury" under § 523(a)(6), however, is not limited to
circumstances in which the debtor desires to bring about the consequences of his
conduct. If the debtor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially
certain, to result from his conduct, the debtor is treated as if he had, in fact, desired to
produce those consequences
. Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852
(8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, cmt. a
(1965)), aff'd, 523 U.S. 57 (1998). '

Our Geiger opinion makes clear that in this circuit
the "willful" element is a subjective one, requiring proof that the debtor desired to
bring about the injury
or was, in fact, substantially certain that his conduct would
result in the injury that occurred. See id. at 852-54

(snip)


We begin our application of this legal authority by clarifying the scope of our
inquiry under § 523(a)(6). That provision exempts "debts . . . for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor." The plain language of § 523(a)(6) requires courts
applying the exemption to first determine exactly what "injury" the debt is "for,"
and
then determine whether the debtor both "willful[ly] and malicious[ly]" caused that
"injury."


[So why wasn't the Nifong bankruptcy process delayed until after the above were
determined?]



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Walt-in-Durham

"[So why wasn't the Nifong bankruptcy process delayed until after the above were
determined?]
"

It was.

Nifong filed bankruptcy, as is his right. The plaintiffs objected to the dischargeability of their claim against him. The Bankruptcy Court agreed that the claim as stated was non-dischargeable and should be abandoned to the District Court where it could be better determined. Nifong's bankruptcy has thus been delayed.

Walt-in-Durham
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Quasimodo

Quote:
 
The plaintiffs objected to the dischargeability of their claim against him. The Bankruptcy Court agreed that the claim as stated was non-dischargeable and should be abandoned to the District Court where it could be better determined.


Hmmm...but then does that mean that if the bankruptcy court determined that the plaintiffs
had alleged a sufficient claim against Nifong as would require it to be determined by the court,
that the claim is also sufficient--if accepted as true--to require the court to permit the plaintiffs' suits
to proceed (and not be dismissed)?



Edited by Quasimodo, Mar 30 2011, 09:40 AM.
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Walt-in-Durham

Quasimodo
Mar 30 2011, 09:32 AM
Quote:
 
The plaintiffs objected to the dischargeability of their claim against him. The Bankruptcy Court agreed that the claim as stated was non-dischargeable and should be abandoned to the District Court where it could be better determined.


Hmmm...but then does that mean that if the bankruptcy court determined that the plaintiffs
had alleged a sufficient claim against Nifong as would require it to be determined by the court,
that the claim is also sufficient--if accepted as true--to require the court to permit the plaintiffs' suits
to proceed (and not be dismissed)?



Non-dischargeable does not mean Nifong necessarily loses on the merits. Only that the claim as framed now is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. If the District Court ever clarifies, it may be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Probably won't be though.

Walt-in-Durham

PS: I have posted elsewhere on this board that I see ample evidence of both police and prosecutorial misconduct that I don't think the case will be dismissed at Summary Judgment. I don't know why Beaty is dragging his feet. No matter how he rules, somebody is going to appeal. The only thing for Beaty to do is pick a brief that he thinks will hold up better at the 4th Circuit, adopt it and make his ruling. But, he's not the first judge to get a case of appeals fright.
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Baldo
Member Avatar

I have no idea what is happening, but its pretty pathetic that the 2006 Duke Lacrosse Team, their Families, and Coaches can't get any movement in the Legal System. It is taking sooo long.

One day whether on appeal or not this case will move out of what I see is the protection by some of dirty rotten secrets.
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sdsgo

Baldo,

I think Judge Beaty was waiting for today's opinion in Connick v. Thompson. Not good news.

Supreme Court Decides Connick v. Thompson
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Walt-in-Durham

sdsgo
Mar 30 2011, 08:55 PM
Baldo,

I think Judge Beaty was waiting for today's opinion in Connick v. Thompson. Not good news.

Supreme Court Decides Connick v. Thompson
I have not had a chance to read the whole opinion, but the news reports are not good. It may leave only the lineup as a section 1983 claim against Nifong. Everything else may be state law.

Walt-in-Durham
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Quasimodo

Haven't looked at the whole thing; but I think that it does not include
a situation where the DA willfully and maliciously conceals evidence.

It appears to have a very narrow focus, which is not really applicable
to a situation in which there is a deliberate frame.

(But I haven't studied the whole thing.)

"The District Court should have
granted Connick judgment as a matter of law on the failure-to-train claim because Thompson did not prove a
pattern of similar violations
that would “establish that the
‘policy of inaction’ [was] the functional equivalent of a
decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.



OTOH, Durham accepted what was done and defended the DPD's actions,
saying that the police were in control every step of the way. It promoted
those who were involved (Addison), indicating approval of their actions.

And so on.

I think there is more than enough to indicate that the city approved
what was done in the lax case--ie, it approved violations of the constitution.

(But, as noted, I haven't gotten to the whole thing yet.)
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Quasimodo

I wonder, however, if based on this new SCOTUS decision, the defendants will
now want to make MORE motions trying to incorporate this case.

Of course, if you wait long enough there will always be more decisions
and more SCOTUS rulings.

I think at some point the judge has to rule on the law as it is unless
he wants to show that he has surrendered control of his courtroom and the process.
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kbp

I'm not the sharpest tool in the shed, but I had read articles on the ruling and considered it to be a weak excuse for allowing ignorance as an excuse ...as if the prosecutors were not familiar with Brady. A great many people that do not practice law understand the basic concept of what Brady is about.

Anyway, it seems like ignorance is the excuse, where as an intentional act applies to Nifong and his co-conspirators.

What am I missing that Beaty gets from this case?
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