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Why Judge Beaty should recuse himself
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Topic Started: Mar 19 2011, 01:05 PM (3,756 Views)
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Quasimodo
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Mar 26 2011, 01:12 PM
Post #61
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http://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2011/03/02/Judge-recuses-self-over-Mets-cap/UPI-94771299106291/
Judge recuses self over Mets cap Published: March. 2, 2011 at 5:51 PM
NEW YORK, March 2 (UPI) -- A New York judge has recused himself from a lawsuit against the Mets after he was spotted wearing a ball cap bearing the team's logo.
Federal Magistrate Judge Andrew Carter stepped aside Tuesday from a lawsuit against the Mets brought by vendor Kosher Food Inc. after the company's lawyer spotted him wearing a Mets cap outside the courthouse, the New York Daily News reported Wednesday.
Carter said he was taking himself off the case to avoid perceptions of bias.
(snip)
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Quasimodo
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Mar 26 2011, 01:16 PM
Post #62
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http://wislawjournal.com/blog/2010/11/01/siefert-recuses-self-due-to-party-affiliation/
Siefert recuses self due to party affiliation POSTED: Monday, November 1st, 2010 at 9:50 am BY: WISCONSIN LAW JOURNAL STAFF Tags: By Marie Rohde The Daily Reporter
The only judge in Wisconsin who is a registered member of a political party has excused himself from hearing a lawsuit against the Republican candidate for secretary of state.
Milwaukee County Circuit Judge John Siefert, a registered Democrat, said in a written statement Friday said that while judges should not sidestep high profile cases, they should avoid the appearance of impropriety.
(snip)
“The judicial system strives to have litigants subjectively feel that they are being treated fairly and impartially,” Siefert said in a statement of his reasons for recusal.
In 2008, Siefert filed a federal lawsuit asking that a rule barring Wisconsin judges from belonging to political parties or contributing to partisan campaigns be declared unconstitutional. Federal District Judge Barbara Crabb ruled in his favor. A federal appellate court found that a judge can belong to a political party but cannot endorse partisan candidates.
A petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case has been filed.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 26 2011, 01:19 PM
Post #63
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https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=33+J.+Legal+Prof.+85&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=aa91d386e49d07c4a13bd5efb14c71ab
In what was undoubtedly one of the oddest moments of Supreme Court jurisprudence, renowned Justice Felix Frankfurter recused himself in Public Utilities Comm'n of District of Columbia v. Pollak because of his strong objection to the playing of the radio on public buses.
As Justice Frankfurter explained in a memorandum included with the decision, "my feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it."
Although Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that his judicial "training, professional habits," and "self-discipline" made him generally able to put aside such personal opinions in adjudicating a case, he felt that his subconscious hatred of the practice of playing the radio on the bus was so acute that his "unconscious feelings" might "operate in the ultimate judgment," or-at the very least-lead others to believe they influenced the outcome.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 26 2011, 07:19 PM
Post #64
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http://naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/Motion%20to%20Disqualify%20or%20Recuse%20District%20Court%20of%20Swisher%20Co%20TX.pdf
IN THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF SWISHER COUNTY, TEXAS
and
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, AUSTIN, TEXAS
____________________________________
JASON JEROME WILLIAMS, )
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Applicant, ) Nos. 51,824 – 01, -02, -03, -04
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STATE OF TEXAS, )
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Respondent. )
____________________________________)
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OR RECUSE TRIAL COURT
(snip)
1. Mr. Williams filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Swisher County District Court on January 7, 2002. He then filed a Motion for Discovery on January 29, 2002, and a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on February 1, 2002. His Application was transferred to the Court of Criminal Appeals on February 22, 2002. The District Attorney made no response to any of the claims presented in Mr. Williams’s Application. He also made no opposition to any of the motions filed in conjunction with his Application. Furthermore, the District Court took no action on Mr. Williams’s discovery or evidentiary hearing motions.
(snip)
3. In light of this Order – as well as Article 11.07 of the Texas Criminal Code of Procedure, Article 1, §§ 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution, and Amendments V, VI and XIV of the United States Constitution – applicant Jason Jerome Williams respectfully requested, on October 17, 2002, that the Court allow him to conduct discovery on an expedited basis and to hold an evidentiary hearing following the completion of discovery. In addition to a Motion for Expedited Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing, Mr. Williams’s counsel filed two Motions of
Non-resident Attorney Seeking Permission to Participate in Texas Proceedings, and a Motion for a Hearing on the Motions filed on October 17, 2002.
4. On October 25, 2002, Mr. Williams filed thirteen additional motions: (1) Motion For Court to Give Notice As To How It Will Comply With Court of Criminal Appeals's Order Dated 9/25/02; (2) Motion to Disqualify District Attorney; (3) Motion for Hearing on Motion to Disqualify District Attorney Filed 10/25/02; (4) Application to Take Deposition of Tom Coleman; (5)Application to Take Deposition of District Attorney Terry McEachern; (6) Application to Take Deposition of Sheriff Larry Stewart; (7) Application to Take Deposition of Commander Michael Amos; (8) Application to Take Deposition of Sergeant Jerry Massengill; (9) Application to Take Deposition of Linda Swanson; (10) Application to Take Deposition of Sheriff Kenneth Burke; (11) Application to Take Deposition of James Collier Adams; (12) Application to Take Deposition of Custodian of Records of Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education; and (13) Motion for Hearing on All Applications to Take Depositions Filed on October 25, 2002.
5. As of this date, the District Attorney has not responded to any of the motions described in paragraphs three and four above, and the District Court has not decided any of these motions.
(snip)
14. The right to an impartial judge is a bedrock constitutional right. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Due Process clause “may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). See United States v. Jordan, 49 F. 3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1995).
15. Bias is a common law ground for judicial disqualification when the bias is of such character that it denies a defendant due process. See Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
[I submit that the plaintiffs in the lax cases have been denied due process through court-imposed delays and that there is considerable doubt in the minds of many reasonable observers as to whether the presiding judge ever intends to permit plaintiffs' cases to reach trial stage.]
(snip)
16. “A trial judge ruling on a motion alleging bias as a ground for disqualification must decide whether the movant has provided facts sufficient to establish that a reasonable man, knowing all the circumstances involved, would harbor doubts as to the impartiality of the trial judge.” Kemp, 846 S.W.2d at 305. See also, Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F. 2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982).
[I submit that there are many followers of these cases (and readers of this and other blogs) who, meeting the definition of "reasonable" persons, by now harbor doubts about the impartiality of the trial judge.]
(snip)
II. Judge Self must either recuse himself or be recused from presiding over further proceedings in Mr. Williams’s case because a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial
(snip)
24. Rule 18(b) states that a judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. “A judge ‘shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which . . . his impartiality might reasonably be questioned’ . . . The language is imperative and mandatory, not permissive or discretionary; the standard is objective, not subjective.” Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W. 2d 872, 873 (Tex. 1995). It is “virtually impossible to articulate a bright line test” to govern recusal; the determination “must be made on a case-by-case fact-intensive basis.” Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W. 3d 685, 688 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2001). In determining whether to recuse a judge, the inquiry should be whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.
(snip)
25. The statutory language mandates recusal whenever impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Tex. R. C. P. 18(b)(2)(a).2 There is no requirement that partiality be demonstrated. Rather, the “appearance” of impropriety is sufficient to trigger recusal. See Woodruff, 51 S.W. 3d at 738. The “trial court’s duty [is] to determine whether the movant [has] provided facts sufficient to establish that a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts involved in the public domain concerning the judge’s conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.”
2 The appearance of impartiality standard is by no means unique to the Texas courts. See, e.g., Ham v. State, 540 So. 2d 805, 807-808 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (no reasonable basis to question judge's impartiality); Giralt v. Vail Village Inn Assoc., 759 P.2d 801, 804 (Colo. App. 1988) (court must eliminate every semblance of reasonable doubt as to its impartiality); LaBow v. LaBow, 13 Conn. App. 330, 334 537 A. 2d 157, 161 (Conn. App. 1988) (controlling standard is whether reasonable person who is aware of all circumstances would question impartiality); Scott v. United States, 559 A. 2d 745, 754 (D.C. App. 1989) (appearance of partiality is sufficient); Weber v. State, 547 A. 2d 948, 952 (Del. Super 1988) (disqualification required when impartiality might reasonably be questioned); Love v. State, 569 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. App. 1990) (ex parte communications violates appearance of impartiality); Isaacs v. State, 257 Ga. 126, 355 S.E. 2d 644 (Ga. 1987) (fact that judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned is sufficient for disqualification); People v. DelVecchio, 129 Ill. 2d 265, 275, 544 N.E. 2d 312, 317, 135 Ill. Dec. 816, 821 (Ill. App. 1989) (guiding principle is whether the average person, acting as judge, could not hold nice, clear, and true balance between the State and the accused); State v. Strayer, 242 Kan. 618, 625-626, 750 P. 2d 390, 396 (Kan. 1988) (question whether facts create a reasonable doubt not in judge's or litigant's mind but in mind of a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts); Pierce v. Charity Hosp. of Louisiana at New Orleans, 550 So. 2d 211, 215 (La. App. 1989) (facts must show that observer could reasonably perceive that court was biased); Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 86, 581 A. 2d 1, 9, (Md. 1990) (test is whether reasonable person knowing and understanding all the facts would recuse judge); Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W. 2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986) (where circumstances give bona fide appearance of bias judge should recuse); Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986) (recusal warranted if reasonable person would harbor doubts about impartiality); Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa. Super. 332, 339, 529 A. 2d 1085, 1088 (Pa. Super. 1987) (recusal is required whenever there is substantial doubt as to a jurist’s ability to preside impartially); State v. Neeley, 748 P. 2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988) (a judge should recuse himself when his “impartiality” might reasonably be questioned) ; State v. Brown, 177 W. Va. 633, 641, 355 S.E. 2d 614, 622 (W. Va. 1987)
26. The “appearance of impartiality” standard has also been analyzed in the context of the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-119 (2001). Texas courts have recognized that the language of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(2)(a) is substantially identical to that of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and have therefore relied on cases interpreting Section 455(a) when considering motions for recusal and disqualification. See, e.g., Ludlow v. Deberry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 271 n.3 (Tex. App. 1997); Monroe v. Blackmon, 946 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. App. 1997). In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the D.C. Circuit disqualified a judge based on statements to the media about a pending case, and at the decision’s core was a concern for the “appearance of impartiality.”
(snip)
Indulging it compromises what Edmund Burke justly regarded as the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” Cold or not, federal judges must maintain the appearance of impartiality. What was true two centuries ago is true today: "Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges."
[By now what confidence remains that the judge's rulings in these cases will be 'coldly impartial' and not biased against the plaintiffs' cases? How many will harbor doubt? And especially so, if the judge rules against them on major matters? How many will by now harbor doubt that he has been an impartial judge?]
(snip)
30. Furthermore, the Texas courts have repeatedly underscored the compelling public policy interest – as distinct from any constitutional, statutory or common law grounds – in ensuring the appearance of an impartial judiciary. “The impartial standard has been adopted in order that the public, i.e., the person on the street, might have confidence in the judiciary and to protect judges from unjustified complaints about their being partial in their decision.” Aguilar, 855 S.W. 2d at 804-805 (Osborn, C.J., concurring).
Public policy demands that a judge who tries a case act with absolute impartiality. It further demands that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or the integrity of the court.
Judicial decisions rendered under circumstances that suggest bias, prejudice or favoritism undermine the integrity of the courts, breed skepticism and mistrust, and thwart the principles on which the judicial system is based.”
(snip)
31. Disqualification of a judge from acting in a proceeding in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, and independent is intended not merely for the benefit of the parties to the suit, who are entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, but for the general interests of justice, by preserving the purity and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the people for their decisions. See 46 AM JUR. 2D, Judges § 86. Moreover, judicial tribunals must not only be, but must appear to be, impartial, so that where circumstances are such as to create in the mind of a reasonable person a suspicion of bias, disqualification may be warranted although there is no proof of actual bias. See id.
(snip)
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Quasimodo
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Mar 27 2011, 04:30 PM
Post #65
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The local federal rules in Oregon:
http://www.ord.uscourts.gov/local-rules-of-civil-procedure/lr-83-rules-and-directives-by-the-district-court
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LR 83-13 Reminders to the Court
(a) Matters Under Advisement
If any matter, including a motion or a decision in a bench trial, is under advisement more than sixty (60) days, each affected party must send the assigned judge a letter describing the matter and stating when it was taken under advisement. Every forty-five (45) days thereafter, while the matter remains under advisement, each affected party must send a similar letter to the Chief Judge.
[I'd hate to think how much postage this would be costing the attorneys if this rule were in effect in N. Carolina.
But there is a reason for this rule--because no judge ought to need a year to decide a simple motion (such as whether or not the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient grounds for their case to proceed to the discovery stage).]
(b) Failure to Schedule a Preliminary Pretrial Conference
Unless a trial date has already been set, if the assigned judge fails to schedule a preliminary pretrial conference within fourteen (14) days after the lodging of the pretrial order or order waiving the pretrial order, each affected party must send the assigned judge a letter advising that no conference has been set.
[Again, this is to help move things along; and because there is an obvious acknowledgement that justice delayed is justice denied.]
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Quasimodo
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Mar 27 2011, 10:07 PM
Post #66
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Jul 1, 2008 :
"Beaty is considering a similar set of dismissal motions in the Evans/Finnerty Seligmann case."
The findings of FACT by the state bar, are more than adequate to demonstrate that the plaintiffs in the current suits have grounds for proceeding with their suits.
That's all that's required, and it doesn't take nearly three years to read the state bar findings of fact.
Is the message being sent out (now, and to all future would-be reformers and protesters) by Judge Beaty:
"No, you can't fight the system"?
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Quasimodo
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Mar 27 2011, 10:13 PM
Post #67
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A POSTER COMMENT from the Liestoppers main blog in January 2007:
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On the flip side, that being Mike Nifong, the players have causes of action for violation of their civil rights under color of law (42 USC Section 1983). Mike Nifong, in a moment of galling stupidity, decided to make himself the lead investigator on the case. The reason this is ridiculously stupid is because as a prosecutor, Nifong enjoys absolute immunity. However, as a police officer, and his role was primarily that of a police officer when he named himself chief investigator, that immunity falls to qualified immunity.
Now, if the poster-an attorney--knew this simple fact in Jan 2007, why has Judge Beaty been unable to arrive at the same simple conclusion in more than THREE YEARS of contemplating the issue?

Does Judge Beaty think it's OK for a prosecutor to pose like this for the cameras,
about a "strangulation" which never happened, for a crime which never happened...
and that he has immunity for such making such poses before the press?
If he is not able to understand the law or the facts, which are easy enough for lay readers of blogs to read and grasp in less than an hour...
maybe he should be recused for lack of competence?
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Quasimodo
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Mar 27 2011, 10:20 PM
Post #68
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The State Bar made its FINDINGS OF FACT July 27, 2007
The Civil Complaint was filed October 5, 2007.
It has been more than three years--more than 1200 days, in fact--since the State Bar concluded that Nifong had wronged the plaintiffs and caused them 'significant actual harm'.
Judge James Beaty has had more than 1200 days to consider whether or not the State Bar erred.
Either he agrees with the State Bar, that the plaintiffs were caused significant actual harm; or he disagrees with them and declares the State Bar to have been in error, and declares the plaintiffs were not caused significant actual harm.
But in fact, he does not have to even agree with them; at this stage of the proceedings, he has only to agree that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient grounds to permit their suit to continue to discovery.
And the findings fact of the State Bar of North Carolina are more than sufficient grounds for the plaintiffs to be shown to have a case, and that the suits are not frivolous.
(That's all that's at issue at this point--are the suits frivolous and groundless or not. That's it. For 1200 days, are the suits groundless? And the State Bar has already found as FACT that the plaintiffs were caused significant actual harm--hence, they have grounds for a suit.)
Ergo, what was the 1200 + day delay been for?
'Judicial economy' would have permitted discovery to begin at once.
There has likely seldom, if ever, been a suit brought in recent history where the grounds have been presented by the state bar itself;
ergo, any delay in deciding that the state bar was correct (or in attempting to repeat its conclusions)--especially when the court is required at this state to accept as fact the allegations of the plaintiffs--is simply a tremendous waste of resources, both of the litigants and of the court, and is exactly the reverse of 'judicial economy'.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 27 2011, 10:21 PM
Post #69
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What did Travis Mangum know?
What did Covington know?
Would it have imperiled judicial economy for us to be able to find out?
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sdsgo
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Mar 28 2011, 07:46 AM
Post #70
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"... about a "strangulation" which never happened, for a crime which never happened..." Ref Post above.
PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT CORRECTING THEIR BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS CITY OF DURHAM, MARK GOTTLIEB, AND BENJAMIN HIMAN
It has come to our attention that a factual assertion contained in three of the opposition briefs we filed on August 28, 2008, is apparently in error. Specifically, we stated that Crystal Mangum never told Sergeant Mark Gottlieb or Officer Benjamin Himan that she had been choked during the alleged rape. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant City of Durham’s Motion to Dismiss at 31; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Mark Gottlieb’s Motion to Dismiss at 5; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Benjamin Himan’s and Defendant Linwood Wilson’s Motions to Dismiss at 4-5. That assertion is not supported by the allegations in the Complaint and appears to be contradicted by the only relevant evidence of which we are currently aware.
<SNIP>
Dated: September 15, 2008
s/ William J. Thomas William J. Thomas, II (N.C. Bar # 9004) 119 East Main Street Durham, NC 27701 Tel. (919) 682-5648 Email: thomas@tfmattorneys.com
Obviously, Crystal was not choked or raped, but the issue of who knew what when is relevant.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 28 2011, 08:47 AM
Post #71
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(That's all that's at issue at this point--are the suits frivolous and groundless or not. That's it. For 1200 days, are the suits groundless? And the State Bar has already found as FACT that the plaintiffs were caused significant actual harm--hence, they have grounds for a suit.)
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Based upon the preceding FINDINGS OF FACT, the Hearing Committee makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(a) By making statements to representatives of the news media including but not limited to those set forth in paragraphs 17-35, 37-42, 49,50, 61,62, and 76, Nifong made extrajudicial statements he knew or reasonably should have known would be disseminated by means of public communication and would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter, in violation of Rule 3.6(a), and made extrajudicial statements that had a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused, in violation of Rule 3.8(f) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct.
(snip)
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING DISCIPLINE
(snip)
4. Nifong's misconduct resulted in significant actual harm to Reade Seligman, Collin Finnerty, and David Evans and their families. Defendant's conduct was, at least, a major contributing factor in the exceptionally intense national and local media coverage the Duke Lacrosse case received and in the public condemnation heaped upon the Duke Defendants. As a result of Nifong's misconduct, these young men experienced heightened public scorn and loss of privacy while facing very serious criminal charges of which the Attorney General of North Carolina ultimately concluded they were innocent.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 28 2011, 10:22 AM
Post #72
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"a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge's conduct..."
That's us, folks.
Based on what we know of the judge's conduct (what is in the public domain), how many of us now are prepared to accept that a ruling against the plaintiffs on major issues in the suits is only the result of his legal analysis, and not the result of a bias against the plaintiffs--or a determination that these witnesses must never be compelled to testify?
How many will harbor a considerable doubt?
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http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
Congress has created a procedure that permits any person to file a complaint in the courts about the behavior of federal judges-but not about the decisions federal judges make in deciding cases. Below is a link to the rules that explain what may be complained about, who may be complained about, where to file a complaint, and how the complaint will be processed. There is also a link to the form you must use.
Almost all complaints in recent years have been dismissed because they do not follow the law about such complaints. The law says that complaints about judges' decisions and complaints with no evidence to support them must be dismissed. If you are a litigant in a case and believe the judge made a wrong decision-even a very wrong decision-you may not use this procedure to complain about the decision. An attorney can explain the rights you have as a litigant to seek review of a judicial decision.
You would not be complaining about a decision--but about NOT making a decision--about actions which have given you a clear cause to doubt the impartiality of the presiding judge; and a belief that "you can't fight the system", because our judicial system is not robust enough to bring major political figures into court on level ground with common citizens. The politicians (Steel, Blue, Bell) and their powerful supporters (Barber, Brodhead, Gergen, etc.) will always be protected.
Whether the above is the actual intent of Judge Beaty's delays and rulings or not, it is the practical effect.
A judge who takes three years (or extends a process to last three years) to decide whether or not plaintiffs in a case have sufficient grounds to proceed with their case, after the state bar has already confirmed such grounds as findings of fact, is either incompetent or willfully biased.
A judicial system which is unable to bring the perpetrators of a deliberate frame to justice, because they are too powerful to be touched, is unworthy the name.
We've seen an attempted frame-up, then an attempt to smother any investigation by the DPD, the city, the Whichard committee, the federal government,
and now the civil suits appear to be headed in the same direction.
But Congress has given you the ability to have a say in this; here's the form:
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/judcomfm.pdf
Make some noise.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 28 2011, 10:34 AM
Post #73
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And I don't care if the judge rules today. The Impartiality Train pulled out of the station about three years ago, when he intervened to prevent the taking of testimony.
It would be nice to believe that this is a country where even the powerful can't break the laws with impunity, and where they can be brought to court on an equal level with a common citizen.
But the actions of Judge Beaty from the very start of this case have reinforced the impression that this is instead a country where the powerful stick together to protect themselves; and against their clout and influence, laws and processes are bent to serve their interests and citizens' rights exist only on paper.
If we do not battle for those rights, we lose them. If we accept that the DPD, the city, the Whichard Committee, the federal government, et al, can cover up a deliberate frame attempt and protect the guilty, then we permit a system to remain in place which will retain its ability to inflict more injustices on others in the future.
There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest.
Once you bring life into the world, you must protect it. We must protect it by changing the world.
--Ellie Wiesel
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abb
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Mar 28 2011, 11:53 AM
Post #74
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- Quasimodo
- Mar 28 2011, 10:34 AM
And I don't care if the judge rules today. The Impartiality Train pulled out of the station about three years ago, when he intervened to prevent the taking of testimony.
It would be nice to believe that this is a country where even the powerful can't break the laws with impunity, and where they can be brought to court on an equal level with a common citizen.
But the actions of Judge Beaty from the very start of this case have reinforced the impression that this is instead a country where the powerful stick together to protect themselves; and against their clout and influence, laws and processes are bent to serve their interests and citizens' rights exist only on paper.
If we do not battle for those rights, we lose them. If we accept that the DPD, the city, the Whichard Committee, the federal government, et al, can cover up a deliberate frame attempt and protect the guilty, then we permit a system to remain in place which will retain its ability to inflict more injustices on others in the future.
There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest.
Once you bring life into the world, you must protect it. We must protect it by changing the world.
--Ellie Wiesel
Which is why we all do what we do. Very well put.
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Quasimodo
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Mar 29 2011, 01:05 PM
Post #75
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What do we think Judge Beaty has been doing for the past year (or the past three years?)
Sitting in an ivory tower contemplating whether the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient grounds for their suits to proceed?
That's ridiculous; those grounds have been obvious from before the cases started (the evidence is on video tape and in the State Bar findings).
The only thing he could have been doing for the past year is trying to force the parties into settlements.
But which side is going to yield in such negotiations? If the issue were simply money, these cases would have been over long before now.
But obviously one side won't yield on the matter of admitting (confessing) what it did, which is what must accompany any financial settlement.
If Judge Beaty really were neutral and wanted to force settlements, then he should have permitted discovery to proceed; That, and that alone (since the defendants have access to almost unlimited funds through Duke and then the Trustees' own private funds) could pressure the defendants to yield.
And since he has not done so, but intervened right at the very start to prohibit the only thing which could have pressured the defendants;
and has instead permitted every kind of delay (Nifong's faux bankruptcy) to stall the proceedings at square one for over three years,
the only result of his actions (and a foreseeable result) was that the plaintiffs have been pressured to give up and accept the bribe to let the defendants off the hook.
Without the pressure of that kind of stalling, the defendants would have no hope of avoiding testimony. This is the ONLY gambit they have;
THEY HAVE NO HOPE TO WIN THE SUITS IF THE CASES EVER COME TO TRIAL.
So what they MUST do is delay, delay, and delay some more.
And hope the plaintiffs get worn out.
And it is ludicrous to assume that Judge Beaty as an experienced federal judge also does not know that, and has not known it from the start of the suits.
And his decision to intervene and prevent the civil suits from taking their normal course of action with discovery is IMHO ample proof of his bias towards the plaintiffs, and his deliberate rendering of assistance to them.
(MOO)
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